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I. INTRODUCTION
More than one in every eight women in Nebraska-or over 84,000
women-have been the victim of at least one rape in their lifetimes.1
National numbers indicate that more than 60% of women raped since
age eighteen were raped by a current or former intimate partner.2
DaNell Bartunek is one of these women. Due to the negligent supervi-
sion of one of its habitually violent intensive supervision probationers,
the State of Nebraska allowed Bartunek to become the victim of a vio-
lent, knife-wielding attempted rape by her former boyfriend, who was
also the perpetrator of previous rapes and other intimate partner vio-
lence against Bartunek. This violent sexual assault by Nebraska's
probationer followed a pattern of abuse and stalking directed at Bar-
tunek, which the State knew about and had the ability to end by ade-
quately controlling its probationer. However, the State did not
intervene before the attack. The Nebraska Supreme Court has now
decided that the State will not be held accountable for its lack of su-
pervision and that DaNell Bartunek must bear the full cost of her pre-
ventable and foreseeable injuries.
In Bartunek v. State,3 the Nebraska Supreme Court missed an op-
portunity to impose a narrowly defined yet workable duty on the state
probation system to act with reasonable care while supervising violent
felons on intensive supervision probation ("ISP").4 This Note argues
1. DEAN G. KILPATRICK & KENNETH J. RUGGIERO, MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, RAPE IN NEBRASKA: A REPORT TO THE STATE 10 (2003) [hereinafter
RAPE IN NEBRASKA REPORT].
2. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCI-
DENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 43 (2000) [hereinafter FINDINGS
FROM THE NVAW SURVEY]. For a description of this survey, see infra note 121.
3. 266 Neb. 454, 666 N.W.2d 435 (2003).
4. ISP was instituted by the Nebraska Legislature in 1990 in an effort to "relieve
prison overcrowding by using electronic monitoring to supervise probationers in
the community. ISP is intended for those who do not need incarceration, but are
not suitable for traditional probation." Id. at 455, 666 N.W.2d at 437. A state-
ment of legislative intent is also found in the statute:
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that the Nebraska Supreme Court's rejection of any such duty to
DaNell Bartunek was incorrect. There is legal support for imposing a
duty in this case based on a special relationship between Bartunek
and the State and/or a special relationship between the State and Bar-
tunek's attacker George Andrew Piper. The basis for these special re-
lationships is found in section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and caselaw interpreting that section. In addition to legal duties
grounded in the Restatement and caselaw from Nebraska and else-
where, there are compelling policy reasons to find a duty in cases like
Bartunek.
Part II sets forth the factual background of the Bartunek case. Al-
though many of the facts in the background section were not included
in the statement of facts of the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion,
they are nevertheless highly relevant to the legal issues presented by
Bartunek and are particularly important to this analysis of the hold-
ings in Bartunek.5 All facts presented in this Note were readily avail-
able to the Nebraska Supreme Court and are part of the official
The Legislature finds and declares that intensive supervision probation
programs are an effective and desirable alternative to imprisonment. It
is the Legislature's intent to encourage the establishment of programs
for the intensive supervision of selected probationers. It is further the
intent of the Legislature that such programs be formulated to protect the
safety and welfare of the public in the community where the programs
are operating and throughout the State of Nebraska.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2262.02 (Reissue 1995). See also Bill of Exceptions, E12
(Nebraska Adult Intensive Supervision Probation manual) (outlining ISP as the
"highest level of supervision provided to probationers," the characteristics of
which include highly restricted activities, frequent contact between the proba-
tioner and the officer, electronically monitored "curfew," home visitation, employ-
ment visitation and employment monitoring, and drug and alcohol screening).
Electronic monitoring, a characteristic of ISP, involves an ankle bracelet system
that sends a signal each minute to track whether the probationer is at home as
ordered. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80,
87:16.
In addition to extensive monitoring of all activities, probation officers are ex-
pected to arrest and detain probationers if needed and to submit alleged viola-
tions to the court. Bill of Exceptions, E21 (Intensive Supervision Probation
Officer document outlining the job description of an ISP officer). The statute pro-
vides that following an arrest by a probation officer for a violation of probation,
the county attorney should be notified of the arrest. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2266(5)
(Reissue 1995 & Supp. 2003) (While section 29-2266 has been renumbered and
reorganized since the Bartunek case occurred, its substance has remained sub-
stantially the same following the 2003 revisions.). The county attorney may then
"file with the sentencing court a motion or information to revoke the probation."
Id. § 29-2266(5)(b). Moreover, no arrest is necessary for the county attorney to
file for revocation-filing can be done on a report from the probation officer that a
violation of probation has occurred. Id. § 29-2266(6).
5. These additional facts cite the Bill of Exceptions, which is available in the Schmid
Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law (All testimony is in a
text-only electronic file; exhibits and selected pages of testimony are in hard
copy.). Full page and line number citations were unavailable for material taken
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record. 6 In addition to outlining the factual background of Bartunek,
Part II summarizes the disposition of the case in the district court and
in the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Part III analyzes the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion from so-
cial and legal perspectives. Section III.A discusses the social context
in which Bartunek occurred. The social reality of pervasive violence
against women provides a compelling policy reason for finding a duty.
Imposing a duty in cases like Bartunek would demonstrate a policy
commitment, not only to providing remedies to victims of the State's
negligent supervision of its probationers, but also to curtailing pre-
ventable and foreseeable violence against women, particularly inti-
mate partner violence. Moreover, any thorough legal analysis of duty
must proceed with the reality of this violence in mind.
Section III.B analyzes opportunities for imposing a duty in Bar-
tunek. This Note presents four constructions of a legal duty to DaNell
Bartunek, two of which the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected and two
of which it failed to discuss. The Bartunek court rejected any duty
based on a special relationship between the State and its probationer
under section 315(a). It also overlooked a section 315(a) "identifiable
victim" duty grounded in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia7 and its progeny. In addition, the Bartunek court rejected any
duty based on a special relationship between the State and the victim,
and in doing so, the court narrowly interpreted detrimental reliance
under section 315(b). The court also overlooked a duty grounded in
Brandon v. County of Richardson,8 based on Bartunek's aid to the
State in reporting violations of probation committed against her.
This Note concludes, in Part IV, by suggesting that in a case like
Bartunek, there are several sensible options for imposing a narrowly-
defined legal duty. Such a duty would take account of victim safety
issues associated with violent offenders on probation who are also per-
petrators of intimate partner violence and whose criminal history and
behavior while on probation indicate a propensity for further violence.
Because no duty was found in Bartunek, probation officers can con-
tinue to act negligently as they supervise high-risk probationers.
There is no remedy for victims of this negligent conduct, nor any in-
centive for probation officers to act reasonably. Finding "no duty" de-
nies that the dynamics of domestic violence, sexual assault, and
stalking are not only pervasive cultural problems, but also crimes and
predictable elements of the behavior of certain probationers. The re-
from the text-only electronic Bill of Exceptions file; such citations appear with
page and line number placeholders (i.e., -:-).
6. See NEB. SuP. CT. & CT. APP. R. 5 ("Bill of Exceptions, Making, Preserving, Tran-
scribing, and Delivery of Record of Trial or Other Proceeding").
7. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
8. 252 Neb. 839, 566 N.W.21 776 (1997) [Brandon 1].
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sulting public policy allows for the reckless, unnecessary endanger-
ment of victims of ISP probationers, and is contrary to the intent of
the Nebraska Legislature in curtailing state immunity.
II. BACKGROUND OF BARTUNEK v. STATE
A. Factual Background
DaNell Bartunek was brutally attacked by her former boyfriend
George Andrew Piper on August 15, 1997.9 After breaking into her
home, Piper appeared in Bartunek's bedroom doorway naked except
for his socks, wielding a butcher knife.10 He proceeded to attack and
attempt to rape Bartunek at knifepoint.11 Bartunek believed Piper
was going to kill her, and it appears that he tried.12 During the at-
tack, Piper plunged the knife toward Bartunek's body three to four
times as he had her pinned to her waterbed, striking the bed each
time because Bartunek was able to divert the knife from herself by
pushing on Piper's hand and the knife he held.13 During the attack,
Piper also punched Bartunek in the head and face at least six or seven
times and bit her repeatedly.14 Piper ripped off Bartunek's shorts and
underwear and was about to rape her when the McCook, Nebraska
police broke through the door of her home.15 Bartunek had been able
9. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438-39.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
("Q: What is he saying? A: He was going to do to me like he's done to-before. Q:
What does that mean to you? A: I took it as that he wanted to have sex. Q: That
he has this knife this time? A: Yes. Q: And what are you thinking is going to
happen with-he's got that knife? A: That he was going to kill me or try to. Q:
What did you do? A: He lunged at me with the knife and held me down, and I
grabbed ahold [sic] of the end of the knife underneath of his hand.").
13. Id. ("Q: What did you do when you saw the knife coming down? A: I moved my
arm out farther, the hand that had the hold of it. I made it so it bypassed me. Q:
And what did it hit? A: The waterbed. Q: How many times do you think that
happened? A: It was three or four times."); see also Bill of Exceptions, Testimony
of Sergeant Kevin Darling, Direct Examination 275, -:- ("A:... [Wihen we went
back to work the scene for evidence, the water had dripped from the bed through
the floor and was dripping in the basement.").
14. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
("Q: Then what? A: He was trying to get the knife out of my hand or trying to get
me to let go of it from the top of his hand. And I wouldn't let go, and he kept
biting my hand, my arms, up here on this arm (indicating upper arm). Q: On
your right arm he bit you up on the forearm, up at the top? A: Where the blade
had cut my hand right here. He was biting my arm up on the forearm-the fore-
arm here, trying to get me to let go of it, and I wouldn't let go. And he kept
punching me in the head. He was punching me in the face like six or seven times.
I don't know how many times it was. Q: Where on your face did he punch you? A:
This whole side of my face.").
15. Id. at 365:10; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Sergeant Kevin Darling, Direct
Examination 275, 299:21.
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call 911 as she heard Piper breaking into the basement minutes before
the attack began, and when the police arrived, they could hear
"screaming for help" from outside the front door. 16
This violent attack was the culmination of months of harassment
and escalating fear. Piper was a violent felon on ISP and under the
State's supervision at the time of the attack.17 He was later convicted
of all charges related to the attack on Bartunek, including burglary,
attempted first-degree sexual assault, use of a deadly weapon to com-
mit a felony, second-degree assault, felon in possession of a deadly
weapon, and resisting arrest.i8 What follows is the story of Piper and
Bartunek before the August 15, 1997 attack.
Piper had an extensive criminal record, dating back to 1984 when
he was still a juvenile; he had been both in prison and on traditional
probation. 19 He had also previously violated probation. 20 The Mc-
Cook Chief of Police described Piper as a "career criminal."2 1 Piper
had "numerous theft convictions for burglary, escape, assault, crimi-
nal mischief, criminal trespass and flight to avoid [arrest]."22 Piper
had been convicted of escape from prison.
23
When he attacked Bartunek, Piper was serving a sentence on ISP
for a January 1997 burglary, at which time he had both a gun and a
knife on his person.2 4 He pleaded no contest to that burglary, and was
convicted of possession of burglary tools and criminal trespass.
2 5
Chief Probation Officer Raleigh Haas conducted the presentence in-
vestigation on Piper and recommended that he was not suitable for
any form of probation.2 6 This recommendation was based on previous
16. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
357:07; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Sergeant Kevin Darling, Direct Exami-
nation 275, 299:03.
17. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 455, 666 N.W.2d 435, 437 (2003).
18. Id. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 439; Bill of Exceptions, E27 (Commitment of George
Andrew Piper).
19. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Chief Probation Officer Raleigh Haas, Direct Ex-
amination 198, 214:05; see also Brief of Appellee at 9, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
20. See supra note 19.
21. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of McCook Police Chief Isaac Brown, Direct Exami-
nation 224, -:- ("Q: What was your impression of Andy Piper at that time? How
would you describe him? A: I would describe Andy Piper as a career criminal.").
22. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Sergeant Kevin Darling, Direct Examination
275, :-.
23. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Probation Supervisor David Wegner, Cross Ex-
amination 438, -:- ("Q: He had an escape offense, right? A: Yes.").
24. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Probation Supervisor Lonnie Folchert, Direct Ex-
amination 23, 48:08.
25. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 455, 666 N.W.2d 435, 437 (2003).
26. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Chief Probation Officer Raleigh Haas, Direct Ex-
amination 198, -:- ("Q: Okay. Now, one of your duties as the chief probation
officer was to conduct P.S.I.s, presentence investigations, right? A: That's cor-
rect. Q: One purpose of the presentence investigation is to be able to provide the
[Vol. 83:225
2004] NEBRASKA PROBATION DEP'T OFF THE HOOK 231
failures in traditional probation and Piper's extensive criminal history
including violent offenses. 2 7 Piper was sentenced to thirty-six months
of ISP despite the recommendation against it.28
Piper's Order of Probation required sixty days in jail, followed by
ISP, the first 180 days of which would be on electronic monitoring.29
The order of probation specifically ordered Piper to refrain from "un-
lawful, disorderly, injurious or vicious acts" and to "work, faithfully, at
suitable employment or show proof that employment is being sought
and keep a diary of activities showing job-seeking."30 The order speci-
fied that Piper was prohibited from possessing firearms, knives, or
other dangerous weapons. 3 1 The order also required that Piper "re-
frain from using alcohol" and "attend Alcoholics or Narcotics Anony-
mous meetings."3 2 Piper's signature on the Order of Probation
acknowledged that he understood that "the violation by me of any of
the above conditions is cause for revocation of probation and a possible
sentence to confinement."33 In addition to the terms specified on the
Order of Probation, Piper was obligated to follow direct orders from
his probation officer.3 4 Piper's jail term ended on May 22, 1997, and
he began his ISP.35 No action was taken by the probation department
to plan for Piper's release in light of Piper's violent history and the
recommendation against any form of probation.36
Upon his release from jail, Piper moved in with Bartunek and her
two children from a previous marriage, then ages four and almost
Court with information regarding what sentence is going to be most appropriate,
right? A: That's correct. Q: Another purpose of the P.S.I. is to assist the proba-
tion office in supervising the offender, right? A: Uh-huh. Q: Now, as part of that
job, you also participated in screening offenders to determine whether they were
suitable for [ISP]; is that right? A: Yes."); Id. at -:- ("Q: [reading from deposi-
tion] . . . Do you remember why [Piper was not recommended for any form of
probation]? Had he been revoked before? A: ... Again, I believe he had. I believe
he had a history-a fairly long history and also some violent offenses. It was just
felt that he was not appropriate for [ISP] probation or any kind of probation."); Id.
at 212:25, 213:03.
27. See supra note 26.
28. Bill of Exceptions, E22 (Order of Probation).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 456, 666 N.W.2d 435, 437 (2003).
33. Bill of Exceptions, E22 (Order of Probation).
34. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, -:- ("Q:
You expected him to follow the orders that you, as his probation officer, give to
him, right? A: Correct.").
35. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438.
36. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Probation Supervisor Lonnie Folchert, Direct Ex-
amination 23, 48:12-22; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Probation Supervisor
David Wegner, Cross Examination 438, 438:05; see also Brief of Appellee at 10,
Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
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two.3 7 Piper and Bartunek had started dating in 1996.38 Bartunek
has a G.E.D. and had held several jobs in McCook; at the time of the
attack, she was working at Casey's General Store.3 9 Piper began
abusing Bartunek almost as soon as they began dating, and the abuse
usually occurred when Piper wanted to have sex but Bartunek did not,
at which point Piper would shove Bartunek up against walls and push
her around as a means of coercion. 40 Out of fear of Piper's reaction,
Bartunek did not report to the police any of the rapes or abuse that
occurred during the course of the relationship.
4 1
Piper's ISP officer was Fred Snowardt. 42 Snowardt met with Piper
and Bartunek to discuss the terms of the electronic monitoring that
would be set up in Bartunek's home.4 3 He also reviewed the terms of
the probation, including a requirement that Piper bring in forty job
applications per week until employed.44 Piper "began violating the
terms of this probation almost immediately."45 He did not comply
with the job application requirement and did not regularly attend Al-
coholics or Narcotics Anonymous meetings. 4 6 Piper also failed to go
"where he was supposed to go" when he was released from in-house
curfew and lied about it to Snowardt, all in violation of Snowardt's
direct orders. 47 More significantly, Piper violated his probation re-
peatedly in relation to Bartunek.
37. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 455, 666 N.W.2d at 437; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of
DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319, :.
38. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
323:13.
39. Id. at 321:10.
40. Id. at 328:06; see also Brief of Appellee at 10, Bartunek (No. S-02-07 10).
41. Id. at 328:18; see also Brief of Appellee at 10, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710). Low
reporting rates for rape are very common. It is estimated that only 16% of rapes
are reported. CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE
PUBLIC POLICY & AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, RECIDIVISM OF
SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2001) [hereinafter RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS]. Victims
"may fear that reporting will lead to ... : further victimization by the offender;
other forms of retribution by the offender. . . ; arrest, prosecution, and incarcera-
tion of an offender ... on whom the victim or others may depend; others finding
out about the sexual assault... ; not being believed; and being traumatized by
the criminal justice system." Id.; see also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
42. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456-57, 666 N.W.2d at 437. In June 1997, Snowardt took
a vacation, at which time Don Douglas filled in for him in supervising Piper. Bill
of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 117:21.
Some probation-officer-related incidents infra will refer to Douglas.
43. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456-57, 666 N.W.2d at 437.
44. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (4/16/97).
45. Record at 9, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.) (Find-
ings of Fact); see also Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438. See gener-
ally Brief of Appellee at 11-12, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
46. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438. Piper did not obtain a job until
June 23, 1997. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt).
47. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of
Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, -:- ("Q: And you knew that [Piper] had
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Violations of probation in the form of crimes and prohibited con-
duct toward Bartunek began with Bartunek's discovery of bruises on
her youngest son, inflicted by Piper.48 Piper admitted this child
abuse, and the incident resulted in a citation from the McCook Police
Department issued to Piper, but for some unknown reason the matter
was not prosecuted.49 Nevertheless, the detective who issued the cita-
tion found probable cause that Piper had committed a child abuse
crime. 50 Bartunek immediately ended her relationship with Piper
and demanded that he move out, a decision which was based on the
child abuse incident combined with the ongoing domestic abuse and
prior sexual assaults she had endured from Piper.5 1
Piper contacted Snowardt to inform him that Piper had to move
out of Bartunek's house because he had beaten the child.52
Snowardt's response was to ask if it "could wait until tomorrow," and
Bartunek had to find somewhere else to stay.5 3 Snowardt did get
Piper moved out that evening despite the inconvenience it evidently
caused him.54 Bartunek then reported to Snowardt that her rent
gotten orders on June 19th and ... July l1th to not contact [Bartunek] anymore,
right? A: Right."); Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt)
("7/21/97... Told him-again, not to approach [Bartunek] in any way, shape or
form."), ("7/25/97 ... [Bartunek's father] called to say [Piper] had came [sic] to
Kidd[i]e Korral and hassled [Bartunek] about her giving me the note he had left
in her car. Said he had been there again this morning .... [S]poke with [Piper]
about the above. Denied confronting [Bartunek] at Kidd[ile Korral about let-
ter .... Tried to make me believe that Kidd[ie K. was in accordance with 'direct
route' to work. Denied having been at [Bartunek]'s this morn. Tol[d] him had till
noon to decide if he was going to be honest with me.... [Piper] came to office and
apologized for lying to me about being at [Bartuneki's this a.m. Told him next
time I would just file [for revocation]."). Despite Snowardt's statement to Piper
that he would "just file" next time Piper lied, he did not do so. The next incident
of lying evident in Snowardt's notes is on August 12, three days before the attack
on Bartunek. Id. ("8/12/97 ... Claims he is not contacting [Bartunek] .... Told
him [Bartunek's father] might get [phone] records to prove that [Piper] and his
mother are calling residence.").
48. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
332:04-11; see generally Brief of Appellee at 12-14, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
49. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of
McCook Police Chief Isaac Brown, Direct Examination 224, 245:23.
50. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of McCook Police Chief Isaac Brown, Direct Exami-
nation 224, 245:23.
51. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of
DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319, 335:19.
52. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("6/16/97 . . .
[Piper plaged to tell me he had to move because girlfriend was accusing him of
spanking youngest child and leaving bruises. Asked him if could wait till
tomor[r]ow. Then talked to girlfriend and then her father. She will go to Trenton
and spend night. .. ").
53. Id.; see also Brief of Appellee at 12, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
54. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438; see also Brief of Appellee at 12,
Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
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money was missing.5 5 This money had disappeared while Snowardt
supervised Piper's move out of the house, but Snowardt did not do any
further investigation or report the theft to the court. 56 Nor did
Snowardt report the child abuse citation to the court.5 7 Snowardt did
no investigation or follow-up on the child abuse incident, even though
he could have obtained an affidavit from the police and from Bartunek
about it.58 Not only did Snowardt fail to report the child abuse to the
sentencing court, he did not report it to his supervisors, did not speak
with the county attorney or the detective who issued the citation, and
did not ask to see the bruises on Bartunek's child. 59
After Piper was moved out of Bartunek's house, he began a cam-
paign of harassment and threats against her. Piper repeatedly
showed up at Bartunek's home, her place of work, and her child's day-
care center, and he left her notes and engaged in phone harassment.
60
He threatened suicide if Bartunek did not reconcile with him.61 On
July 11, 1997, the McCook Police department contacted the probation
office to notify them of a report Bartunek had made involving Piper
calling her house sixteen times in one day.6 2 Bartunek was consider-
ing agreeing to charges of phone harassment against Piper.
6 3 Al-
though this criminal behavior was a serious violation of probation, the
probation department conducted no follow-up.6 4 Nor did Snowardt
55. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438 (2003).
56. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
338:16; see also Brief of Appellee at 13, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
57. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438.
58. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of McCook Police Chief Isaac Brown, Direct Exami-
nation 224, 245:23.
59. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 102:23,
102:17, 102:20; Id. at 102:- & 103:- ("Q: In the process of [moving Piper out be-
cause of the child abuse], you did not obtain an affidavit from DaNell? A: No. Q:
You didn't ask to see DaNell's child to look at the bruises? A: No. Q: You didn't
consult with [your supervisor] about this? A: No. Q: Now, it's not necessary to
obtain a conviction in order to seek revocation, is it? A: No."); see also Brief of
Appellee at 13, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
60. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (6/19/97) (show-
ing up at place of employment and repeatedly calling), (7/21/97) (leaving notes on
Bartunek's car at home), (7/25/97) (showing up at the daycare center and harass-
ing Bartunek about turning over to Snowardt the note Piper had left on her car,
plus threat of physical harm to be inflicted on Bartunek by Piper's sister), (8/12/
97) (conducting more phone harassment); Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological
Notes of Don Douglas) (7/11/97) (making sixteen phone calls in one day, which
Bartunek reported to the McCook Police Department with the option of a charge
of phone harassment).
61. Bill of Exceptions, E25 (Note from Piper to Bartunek).
62. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Don Douglas) (7/11/97).
63. Id.
64. Id. (7/11/97) (indicating no follow up with Bartunek by Don Douglas); Bill of Ex-
ceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 120:19 (indicating
Snowardt did nothing in response to the 7/11/97 report of sixteen phone calls in
one day relayed to him by Don Douglas), 122:13 (indicating Snowardt did not
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characterize the behavior as harassment at trial.6 5 Snowardt's typical
response to violations in the form of harassing and stalking Bartunek
was to tell Piper to stop, without further investigation, without gath-
ering information that could be taken to court, without reporting any
violations to his supervisors, and without reporting any of it to the
sentencing court.6 6
The theft, child abuse, threats, and stalking Piper engaged in all
violated the terms in the Order of Probation prohibiting "unlawful,
disorderly, injurious or vicious acts." 67 The stalking and threats often
additionally involved curfew violations when Piper violated direct or-
ders by going out of his approved path to harass Bartunek at home, at
work, or at her children's daycare. Piper often lied about this behavior
contact Bartunek or seek an affidavit from her about phone harassment), 120:24
(indicating Snowardt did not contact the McCook Police Department about the
phone harassment that the police had reported to Snowardt), 122:11 & 122:02
(indicating Snowardt did not consult with his supervisor or the probation officer
who had spoken with the police about the phone harassment), 122:15 (indicating
Snowardt did not notify the court or address the phone harassment with Piper);
see also Brief of Appellee at 15, Bartunek (No. S-02-07 10).
65. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, -:- ("Q:
[Bartunek] claimed that he was harassing her over the phone? A: She claimed
that he was harassing her? Q: Right. A: I can't say that she used the term
'harassing.' Q: Claimed that-she claimed that he had been harassing her over
the phone, to not be calling anymore, right? A: I still don't see the harassing. I
know that she called [Chief Probation Officer] Haas and told him she didn't want
[Piper] to call her anymore."). On the night of the attack, Snowardt did use the
term "harassing." Id. ("Q: ... August 15th, 1997.... Please read that. A: [read-
ing from chronological notes] '8/15/97 ... Called the dispatcher at McCook Police
Department and advised I wanted [Piper] picked up if they located him. Also,
advised of his harassing his girlfriend. Gave address and requested officer check
on her. . . .' Q: You advised the police that [Piper] had been harassing his girl-
friend, right? A: That was the term that had been given to me by the police de-
partment over the phone calls. Q: By the police department? A: On Mr.
Douglas's notes. Q: Okay. And so as of the time of Mr. Douglas's notes, which is
7/11197, you were aware that what was going on was, in fact, harassment? A:
That was their term, not mine. Q: The police regarded it as harassment, right?
A: I didn't take the phone call.").
66. See generally Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt). In
addition to the lack of response to the phone harassment outlined in note 64
supra, see Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination
80, 107:25 (indicating Snowardt did not investigate Bartunek's complaint of June
19, 1997 about Piper coming around her and calling), 111:16 (indicating
Snowardt did not contact the court or his supervisor about the ongoing situation
as reported on June 19, 1997), 108:20 (indicating Snowardt said there "wouldn't
be a need" to contact Bartunek about the harassment), 128:15 (indicating
Snowardt did not follow up with Bartunek in response to the July 11, 1997 report
of Piper leaving a disturbing note on Bartunek's car and did not report the inci-
dent to the court), 132:22 (indicating Snowardt did not report the July 25, 1997
harassment at the daycare center to the court). See also Bartunek v. State, 266
Neb. 454, 457, 666 N.W.2d 435, 438 (2003); Brief of Appellee at 17, Bartunek (No.
S-02-0710).
67. Bill of Exceptions, E22 (Order of Probation).
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to Snowardt. While Snowardt did threaten Piper with revocation pro-
ceedings if he continued to lie about harassing Bartunek, Snowardt
did not follow through by actually filing for revocation proceedings
when Piper subsequently lied.68 On one occasion following an inci-
dent in which Piper broke curfew to go harass Bartunek, Snowardt
actually gave Piper more free time.6 9 Not only was Piper in repeated
violation of his probation, he was also the primary suspect in a knifing
investigation in McCook in the summer of 1997-another fact of
which Snowardt had knowledge before Bartunek was attacked.
70
Bartunek repeatedly went to the probation department with infor-
mation on Piper's violations of probation against her, and received
only additional and intensifying harassment from Piper. She even got
her father involved in her communications to the State,7 1 a fact which
the Nebraska Supreme Court focused on to deny the State owed her a
duty.72 Despite Snowardt's overall ineffectiveness in controlling
Piper, he repeatedly led Bartunek to believe that he would actually do
something to control Piper; in return, she continued her reporting of
Piper's behavior to Snowardt. 73 Bartunek also went to the police for
68. See supra note 47.
69. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (7/25/97).
70. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of McCook Police Chief Isaac Brown, Direct Exami-
nation 224, 239:03, 250:07.
71. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination, 319,
("Q: At some point did you get your dad involved (in reporting incidents to
Snowardt]? A: Yes. Q: Why? A: Because it wasn't doing me any good to talk to
[Snowardt] myself. Q: What did you think dad could do? A: Well, he has a worse
temper than I do, and he might get farther than I did.").
72. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456-57, 461, 666 N.W.2d at 438, 441.
73. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 481,
481:08-12. ("Q: Did you trust that Fred Snowardt was going to try to help you?
A: Yes."). For other examples, see Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of
Fred Snowardt) ("6/16/97 . . . [Piper p]aged to tell me he had to move because
girlfriend was accusing him of spanking youngest child and leaving bruises.
Asked him if could wait till tomor[r]ow. Then talked to girlfriend and then her
father. She will go to Trenton and spend night.... ."), ("6/19/97 ... [Chiefi Hass
advised that [Piper]'s ex-sig[nificantl other had called while I was on phone with
someone else, said she did not want [Piper] coming around where she worked and
not to be calling any more. Called [Piper] and he claims only time he called or
went to Casey's was for job aps [sic] or about furniture. Told him no more."), ("7/
21197 ... Rec'd call from [Bartunek]'s father (Dwight Bartunek) telling me that
[Piper] was still trying to make contact with her. Said he had dropped note off at
her car this morning. Said police said they could do nothing at this time. Told
him to bring note to office and I would advise [Piper] to stay clear of her."), ("7/21/
97 . . . Told [Piper]-again, not to approach [Bartunek] in any way, shape or
form."), ("7/25/97 . . . Dwight Bartunek called to say [Piper] had came [sic] to
Kidd[i]e Korral and hassled [Bartunek] about her giving me the note he had left
in her car. Said he had been there again this morning. Said [Piper] had
threatened them with statement that his sister (from Colo) was going to be there
this morning to 'straighten her out.' Told [Bartunek's father] I would contact
[Piper] this morn."); see also Bill of Exceptions, E25 (the note Piper left in Bar-
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help, but was told that they could do little for her because Piper was
Snowardt's responsibility. 74 Not only was Bartunek proactive in try-
ing to get someone employed by the State to deal with the situation,
she was forced to take desperate measures to protect herself because
of the State's inadequate response. For example, she nailed her win-
dow shut and put a bed over a trap door to her basement.7 5 Bartunek
was terrorized in her own home by someone the State was supposed to
be controlling. The State had both ample notice of the threat Piper
posed to Bartunek and the power to control him, and yet did nothing
in response.
On August 15, 1997, Piper showed up at Bartunek's house in the
morning hours and "demanded a ride to a local store."7 6 Bartunek
testified that Piper had been drinking, and she complied with his de-
mand. 77 Piper left Bartunek's residence after she took him to and
from the store.78 Later that evening, Piper missed his curfew.
7 9
Piper's electronic monitoring device notified Snowardt of the curfew
violation, and Snowardt then called Bartunek and her father to see if
they knew where Piper was.8 0 Bartunek's father asked Snowardt if
he should come to McCook to protect Bartunek and wanted to know
whether someone would be there to protect her.8 1 Snowardt said that
he would send a police officer to Bartunek's house and that it was un-
tunek's car threatening suicide if she did not reconcile with him); E26 (Bar-
tunek's note to Snowardt recording that Piper had been at her house on 7/21/97
at 7:20 a.m.).
74. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
("Q: And how many times did he call in one day? A: It was about 16 times. Q:
Now, there was- A: He kept calling and calling and calling. Q: Sixteen times in
one day seemed like a little too much. A: Most of the time I wasn't answering the
phone because I knew who it was because I had a caller I.D. on the phone. Q:
What was the number that came up on the caller I.D.? A: His mom's house. Q:
That's where he was living now? A: Yes. Q: So, you called the police, right? A:
Yes. Q: What do you remember about talking to the police about this? A: I had
told them that he kept calling my house, and I didn't want him calling my house.
And his mom was calling my house or somebody other than himself was calling
my house. And I kept-I had told them about talking to [Snowardt] a few times,
and [Snowardt] kept saying, oh, I'll take care of it. I'll take care of it. And it's-
the next day he was there again. Q: What did the police tell you? A: They
couldn't do that much about it because he was [Snowardt]'s client.").
75. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
349:21.
76. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438.
77. Id.
78. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Examination 319,
352:13.
79. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438.
80. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Dwight Bartunek, Direct Examination 416,
418:25, 419:03.
81. Id. at 419:21.
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necessary for Mr. Bartunek to travel to McCook.82 Snowardt did send
an officer to Bartunek's house; the officer helped her check around for
Piper in the house and yard and secure the doors, but they found
nothing.8
3
Around midnight, Bartunek heard a noise in the basement and
called the police.84 Officers were dispatched to Bartunek's home.85 At
that point, Piper appeared in Bartunek's bedroom doorway and the
attack described supra ensued. 86 The officers who responded to the
911 call subdued Piper as he yelled and threatened them and Bar-
tunek that he would kill her and one of the police officer's family, and
that since he had escaped from jail before, he could do it again.8 7 (He
did in fact escape from jail following this arrest.)ss Following the at-
tack, Snowardt failed to do any follow-up or investigation with Bar-
tunek to see what had occurred.8 9 Snowardt admitted on the stand
that the case notes he made after the attack questioning Bartunek's
82. Id. at 420:01.
83. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 457, 666 N.W.2d at 438.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Sergeant Kevin Darling, Direct Examination
275, 306:20.
88. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("8/22/97... Ad-
vised by Raleigh [Haas] that [Piper] had escaped from Frontier Co Jail .... [Bar-
tunek's father] was on way to McCook as no one seemed to know where
[Bartunek] was."); see also Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Di-
rect Examination 318, -:- ("Q: Was there a time where you heard that [Piper]
had gotten out again? A: Yes. They said that they had-he'd escaped from jail.").
Upon learning of this escape, Bartunek was frightened such that she stayed at
her father's house until Piper was caught and had her uncle and a sheriff guard-
ing her at work. Id. at -:- ("Q: When dad said, DaNell, I got some bad news.
[Piper] is out. He got out ofjail. What did that feel like to you? A: Go and hide.
Q: Real scared? A: Yeah. Q: What did you think was going to happen? A: That
he was going to come back and finish what he started. Q: So, what happened
from there? A: I-I think I was still staying at my dad's house at the time, and I
was going to stay there until they actually put him somewhere where he couldn't
get loose .... Q: What happened with going to work? A: They weren't too excited
about me going to work with black and blue eyes. My face was black and blue,
and everybody was asking me what happened and all this stuff and- Q: You
didn't want to tell them? A: No, because every time I started to tell them, I'd
probably start crying. Q: That was embarrassing? A: Yeah. Q: When [Piper] got
out, how did they handle it at your workplace when you had to work? A: My
uncle was there, Uncle Dennis, and he came down to where I worked and was
staying there the whole time that I was working. And so-one of the sheriff guys
from the sheriffs department.").
89. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 144:13;
see also Brief of Appellee at 20-21, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
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fear of Piper and criticizing her and her father were made "to protect
myself."9 0
B. Disposition of the Case
Bartunek sued the State of Nebraska under the State Tort Claims
Act 91 for negligent supervision of Piper. 92 There was a three-day
bench trial in the District Court of Red Willow County in December
2001.93 The district court found the State of Nebraska liable for
DaNell Bartunek's injuries, which included ongoing posttraumatic
stress disorder due to the brutal sexual assault, which would require
at least a year and a half of treatment.9 4 Bartunek was awarded
$300,000 in damages. 95 The district court emphasized that its finding
of negligence by the State was premised on the "series of serious viola-
tions over a two (2) month period which were either ignored or dealt
with incorrectly by the probation officer. The probation officer should
have attempted to have Mr. Piper's probation revoked because of his
violent background and continued harassment of the Plaintiff."
96
Thus, the district court's negligence analysis highlighted the fact that
Bartunek was the identifiable victim of a known violent felon who was
in repeated violation of his probation. The district court's brief discus-
90. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 148:14;
Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (8/18/97-11/25/
97).
91. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209-8,235 (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002). Under
the State Tort Claims Act, State immunity is waived in certain situations. Citi-
zens may sue the State by making
any claim against the State of Nebraska for money only on account of
damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the state, while acting within the scope of his or her office or employ-
ment, under circumstances in which the state, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death....
Id. § 81-8,210(4). Specific claims not allowed (where immunity is retained) are
enumerated in the State Tort Claims Act. See id. § 81-8,219. For a discussion of
specific immunities claimed by the State of Nebraska in Bartunek, see notes 98,
307, & 382 infra.
92. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 458-59, 666 N.W.2d 435, 439 (2003).
93. Record at 8, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.). State
Tort Claims Act suits in Nebraska are heard before the district court without a
jury. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,214 (Reissue 1996).
94. Record at 11, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.) (Find-
ings of Fact); id. at 11-13 (Conclusions of Law); id. at 15-16 (Damages). The Ne-
braska Supreme Court did not dispute the finding of posttraumatic stress
disorder. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 458, 666 N.W.2d at 439. See infra notes 149-51
and accompanying text for the definition and prevalence of posttraumatic stress
disorder.
95. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 455, 666 N.W.2d at 437.
96. Record at 12, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.) (em-
phasis added).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sion of duty focused on the nature and purpose of ISP to protect the
public and reduce risk of injury or harm. 97
While issues were raised at trial and on appeal regarding immuni-
ties the State claimed to have, and defenses were raised based on Bar-
tunek's alleged contributory negligence and assumption of risk,98 the
Nebraska Supreme Court focused its analysis of the Bartunek case
solely on the issue of "whether a special relationship existed which
gave rise to a specific duty on the part of the State to protect Bartunek
from Piper."99 The court proceeded to analyze the issue of duty in two
different ways. One section of the analysis focused on a possible spe-
cial relationship between the State and the victim Bartunek under
section 315(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.oo The second sec-
tion of the analysis focused on a possible special relationship between
the State and the violent attacker Piper under sections 315(a) and 319
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.iO' Section 315 provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
97. Id.
98. The district court rejected the State's claims of judicial and quasi-judicial immu-
nity. Record at 13-14, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry &
J.) (Judicial Immunity); id. at 14-15 (Sovereign Immunity Based on Discretion-
ary Function); see also infra note 382. The district court found that the probation
officer's functions were administrative and not judicial functions, so quasi-judi-
cial immunity did not apply. Record at 14, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District
Court Journal Entry & J.). The court also found that the probation officer's deci-
sions made in supervising or failing to adequately supervise Piper were not
within any discretionary function exemption, because that exemption is reserved
for policy decisions. Id. at 15. The State argued for the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk in a motion for dismissal after presentation of
the plaintiffs witnesses, arguing that Bartunek
had knowledge of Mr. Piper's violent tendency. She knew before he was
placed on probation; that he had shoved her violently against the wall.
She knew that he had served time in jail. She knew that his offense for
which he was serving time on probation was burglary, at which time he
had both a knife and a gun. She knew during the time that he had
moved away from her home, when he was on probation, that he had
forced her to have sex, and she didn't report those events. He had bro-
ken into her house on at least one occasion, and she didn't report that.
Bill of Exceptions, Argument by Assistant Attorney General Melanie Whit-
tamore-Mantzios 426-27. The district court flatly rejected the State's claims of
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and mitigation of damages, stating
that "[tihose defenses are based generally on the contention that since the Plain-
tiff had a relationship with [Piper] that she somehow facilitated or consented to
the attack. Those defenses do not merit discussion and the Court finds the State
has not met its burden as to any of those defenses." Record at 13, Bartunek (No.
CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.).
99. 266 Neb. at 459, 666 N.W.2d at 440.
100. Id. at 460-62, 666 N.W.2d at 440-41.
101. Id. at 462-64, 666 N.W.2d at 441-43.
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(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right to protection.
1 0 2
The court stated that it had previously "considered and applied"
section 315(b) special relationships between the negligent party and
the victim in Brandon v. County of Richardson,103 where it stated that
the law recognizes two situations for exceptions to the general no-duty
rule.10 4 These situations are (1) "where individuals who have aided
law enforcement as informers or witnesses are to be protected," or (2)
"where the police have expressly promised to protect specific individu-
als from precise harm."10 5 The first entails a benefit to the State,
while the second involves reasonable detrimental reliance by the vic-
tim on a law enforcement officer's undertaking to protect.
10 6 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court stated in Bartunek that the exception "for
witnesses and informants is inapplicable in the instant case."1o7 It
then considered and rejected the possibility of a special relationship
between Bartunek and the State based on detrimental reliance.
l0 8
The court held that "Bartunek showed no special relationship between
herself and the State that gave rise to a tort duty."10 9
The court then moved on to analyze the potential special relation-
ship between the State and its probationer Piper under sections 315(a)
and 319, an analytical task of first impression for the court.
1 10 A com-
ment to section 315 provides that the "relations between the actor and
a third person which require the actor to control the third person's
102. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). This section defines the type of
special relationships that can create a duty to control a third party's actions or to
prevent the criminal conduct of a third party from harming another; subsection
(a) refers to a relationship between the defendant and the dangerous person and
subsection (b) refers to a relationship between the defendant and the victim. Id.
Section 315 is "a special application of the general rule stated in § 314." Id. at
cmt. c. Section 314 sets forth the general rule that there is no duty to act in aid or
protection of another. Id. § 314.
103. 252 Neb. 839, 566 N.W.2d 776 (1997) [Brandon 1].
104. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 460, 666 N.W.2d at 440.
105. Id. (quoting Brandon 1, 252 Neb. at 844, 566 N.W.2d at 780).
106. Id. at 460-61, 666 N.W.2d at 441. Undertakings to protect are distinguishable
from promises to protect. An undertaking implies an act or omission and not a
mere promise, although the act or omission in addition to a promise can create a
duty. Hamilton v. City of Omaha, 243 Neb. 253, 263-64, 498 N.W.2d 555, 562-63
(1993). A duty to protect a particular individual beyond the existing general duty
to protect the public is not created when a police officer promises to aid a citizen;
some additional "undertaking" must occur to trigger a duty. Id. The Hamilton
court declined to decide whether that additional undertaking must include some
"action" or whether it could be an "assurance alone." Id. at 263, 498 N.W.2d at
562; see also infra note 312 and accompanying text.
107. 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 461-62, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
110. Id. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441 ("This court has not previously analyzed Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 315(a).").
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conduct are stated in sections 316-319."111 The only one of those sec-
tions relevant in Bartunek is section 319,112 which provides: "One who
takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him
from doing such harm."113 The court focused on the comments to sec-
tion 319, interpreting them to modify 315(a) in a literal manner. 1 14
Examples of "takes charge" situations in the comments include "homi-
cidal maniacs" escaping from asylums and delirious smallpox patients
escaping from hospitals.115 The court stated its intention to read sec-
tions 315(a) and 319 narrowly in regard to the "takes charge" ele-
ment.1 16 Relying on caselaw from several other states, the court then
held that a custodial situation was essential to a 315(a) special rela-
tionship.1 17 Indeed, the court demanded "round-the-clock visual su-
pervision" before any duty could be imposed. 11s That construction
eliminated the possibility of a duty in any probation case. The court
held that the district court erred in finding liability, because there was
no special relationship between the State and Bartunek or between
the State and Piper.119
III. ANALYSIS OF BARTUNEK v. STATE
A. Duty as Essential to Addressing Violence Against Women
While the existence of a duty is a fact-dependent question of law
for the court to decide, imposing or withholding a duty is also an ex-
pression of public policy. Moreover, public policy considerations must
inform any thorough legal analysis of duty. Therefore, this Note
presents the public policy framework implicated by the facts of Bar-
tunek before analyzing its legal issues.
The realities of violence against women provide the social context
from which the facts of the Bartunek case emerged-a context that
neither Piper's probation officer nor the Nebraska Supreme Court ad-
dressed in their handling of the Bartunek case. However, this context
provides strong public policy justification for imposition of a duty in
Bartunek. It should also be a critical factor in the legal analysis of
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 cmt. c (1965).
112. Id. § 319; Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965) (emphasis added).
114. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441. The court stated that the illustra-
tions to section 319 "make plain that the phrase 'takes charge' is intended to refer
to a custodial relationship." Id.
115. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 cmt. a, illus. 1 & 2.
116. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
117. Id. at 463, 666 N.W.2d at 442.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 464, 666 N.W.2d at 443.
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duty, both in general and with respect to Bartunek's case in particu-
lar. Bartunek was a victim of intimate partner violence. The sexual
and physical assaults, stalking, intimidation, and verbal abuse Piper
perpetrated against her are typical manifestations of violence against
women, particularly intimate partner violence. An overview of the
general prevalence and interaction of these behaviors will demon-
strate that these social and cultural phenomena were present within
the facts of Bartunek, and that signs of future violence were readily
available to Piper's probation officer.
Violence against women is pervasive throughout United States cul-
ture. Nebraska is no exception. 120 According to the National Violence
Against Women ("NVAW") Survey, 12 1 one in six U.S. women has been
the victim of a completed or attempted rape at some time in her
life. 12 2 According to the survey, an estimated 302,091 U.S. women
had been raped in the previous year-and these women were raped an
average of 2.9 times each in that year, amounting to an estimated
876,064 rapes against U.S. women annually. 12 3 The National Wo-
men's Study reported that only 16%, or one in six rapes, were ever
reported to police, and estimated that over twelve million U.S. women
have survived a rape at least once in their lifetimes. 12 4 According to
120. See generally RAPE IN NEBRASKA REPORT, supra note 1.
121. The NVAW Survey was a "national telephone survey on women's experiences with
violence, conducted from November 1995 to May 1996," sponsored by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) through a grant to the Center for Policy Research. FINDINGS FROM THE
NVAW SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1. The NVAW Survey used a definition of rape
that included forced vaginal, oral, and anal sex that was completed or attempted.
Id. at 13, 25. The policy implications outlined in the NVAW Survey include the
following: violence against women should be treated as a significant social prob-
lem; stalking is more widespread than previously thought; women are at greater
risk of intimate partner violence than men; and violence against women is
predominantly intimate partner violence. Id. at 59-61.
122. Id. at 13. One in thirty-three U.S. men has been a victim of a completed or at-
tempted rape. Id.
123. Id.
124. TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 8 (Emilie Buchwald et. al. eds., 1993) (citing NA-
TIONAL VICTIM CENTER & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CENTER,
MEDICAL UNIV. OF S.C., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION (1992)).
Other studies have also indicated rape reporting rates as low as 16%. See RECIDI-
VISM OF SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 41, at 3. In contrast, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimates that 36% of rapes, 34% of attempted rapes, and 26% of sexual
assaults were reported to police in 1992-2000. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 194530, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE
AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000, at 1 (2002). The reasons given for not re-
porting such assaults included that it was a personal matter (23.3%), that the
victim feared reprisal by the offender (16.3%), and that the police were biased
(5.8%). Id. at 3.
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1993 data, rapes occurred most often in the victim's home between the
hours of 6:00 p.m. and midnight.125
Based on NVAW Survey data, researchers have estimated that
more than one in eight women in Nebraska have been forcibly raped
in their lifetimes. 126 The actual number is probably even higher, be-
cause "Nebraska has a higher percentage of extremely poor women
than the nation at large" and rape is more prevalent among poor wo-
men.1 2 7 In addition, the Nebraska estimate did not include attempted
rapes as the NVAW Survey did.128
Physical assaults on U.S. women are even more prevalent than
rapes and attempted rapes. Of surveyed women, over half said they
were "physically assaulted by an adult caretaker as a child and/or by
another adult as an adult."129 This amounts to about 1.9 million wo-
men assaulted annually.13o Moreover, "rape is often accompanied by
physical assault" in addition to the rape itself, with 41.4% of women
who were raped since age eighteen reporting such assaults involving
"slapping, hitting, kicking, biting, choking, hitting with an object,
beatings, and the use of a gun or other weapon." 13 1
Stalking is also pervasive in the United States, and was found by
the NVAW Survey to be "much more prevalent than previously
thought."132 Based on a definition of stalking requiring the victim to
feel a "high level of fear," approximately one million women are
stalked annually in the United States.133 A "less stringent definition
of stalking" that requires victims to "feel somewhat frightened or a
little frightened by their assailant's behavior" yields much higher
125. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 163392, SEX OFFENSES
AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 5-6 (1997)
[hereinafter SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS]. Victims' reports of times of rapes
and sexual assaults were from 6:00 p.m. to midnight in 43.4% of cases, 6:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m. in 33% of cases, and midnight to 6:00 a.m. in 23.6% of cases. Id. at 5
fig.2. Rapes and sexual assaults occurred in the victim's home in 37.4% of the
cases, at a friend's, neighbor's, or relative's home in 19.2% of cases, on the street
away from home in 10% of cases, in parking lots and garages 7.3% of the time,
and in other locations 26.101o of the time. Id. at 6 fig.3.
126. RAPE IN NEBRASKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
127. See id. at 8.
128. Id. at 11; see also supra note 121.
129. FINDINGS FROM THE NVAW SURVEY, supra note 2, at 16. Fifty-two percent of wo-
men reported such assaults; the percentage of men reporting such assaults was
66.4%. Id.
130. Id. at 17.
131. Id. at 17. The Survey found that 33.9% of men raped since age eighteen reported
similar rape-related assaults. Id.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. Approximately 371,000 men are stalked annually under this definition of
stalking. Id.
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rates, with approximately 12.1 million women stalked some time in
their lives and about six million women stalked annually.134
A crucial aspect to all of this violence against women is the vast
amount perpetrated by intimate partners. Characteristically, violence
against women is predominately intimate partner violence, perpe-
trated almost entirely by men.13 5 In addition, "women were signifi-
cantly more likely than men to report being victimized by an intimate
partner, whether the time period covered was the individual's lifetime
or the previous 12 months and whether the type of victimization con-
sidered was rape, physical assault, or stalking."136 It was reported
that 7.7% of surveyed women were raped by a current or former inti-
mate partner at some time in their lives, and an estimated 201,394
U.S. women are raped by an intimate partner annually. 137 Moreover,
61.9% of the women raped since age 18 were raped by "a current or
former spouse, cohabiting partner, boyfriend, or date."138 Twenty-two
percent of women had been physically assaulted by an intimate part-
ner in their lifetime, and an estimated 1.3 million women are physi-
cally assaulted by an intimate partner annually.139
Stalking by intimate partners is prevalent in the United States
and is linked to other forms of intimate partner violence. Over one-
half of a million women are stalked by an intimate partner annually
in the United States under the definition of stalking requiring a high
level of fear.14o "[H]usbands or partners who stalk their partners are
134. Id. The broader definition of stalking yields estimates of 3.7 million men stalked
in their lifetimes and 1.4 million stalked annually. Id. The crime of stalking is
defined in Nebraska as follows: "Any person who willfully harasses another per-
son with the intent to injure, terrify, threaten, or intimidate commits the offense
of stalking." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.03 (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
135. FINDINGS FROM THE NVAW SURVEy, supra note 2, at 46. According to the NVAW
Survey, 64% "of the women who were raped, physically assaulted, and/or stalked
since age 18 were victimized by a current or former husband, cohabiting partner,
boyfriend, or date." Id. All women raped since age eighteen were raped by a
male, 91.9% of women who were physically assaulted since age eighteen were
assaulted by a male, and 97.2% of women who were stalked since age eighteen
were stalked by a male. Id. Violence against men is also predominately male
violence. Id. at 47.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Id. at 25. The numbers for men indicated that 0.3% of surveyed men were raped
by a current or former intimate partner in their lifetimes. Id.
138. Id. at 43. "In comparison 21.3 percent were raped by an acquaintance, 16.7 were
raped by a stranger, and 6.5 percent were raped by a relative." Id. These per-
centages, along with the 61.9% raped by current or former intimate partners, add
up to more than 100% because some women had multiple assailants. Id. at 44
exhib.22.
139. Id. at 26. Men's responses indicated that 7.4% had been similarly assaulted, and
835,000 men are physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually. Id.
140. Id. at 27-28 (the number estimated is 503,485). The Survey estimated that
185,496 men are stalked annually by an intimate partner under the high-level-of-
fear definition of stalking. Id. at 28.
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four times more likely than husbands or partners in the general popu-
lation to physically assault their partners, and they are six times more
likely ... to sexually assault their partners."'141 Women victims of
stalking reported that male stalkers followed them, spied on them,
stood outside their homes or places of work, and made unsolicited
phone calls at higher rates than what male victims reported.
14 2 Of
the women who were stalked by a current or former intimate partner,
31% were also sexually assaulted by that same partner, and 81% were
physically assaulted by the partner who stalked them.
14 3
The United States Department of Justice has found that "[i]n cases
involving intimates, the strong link between stalking and other forms
of violence between the victim and stalker suggests the need for com-
prehensive training of police officers, prosecutors, judges, parole and
probation officers, and other criminal justice personnel on the specific
safety needs of stalking victims."'14 4 This link between stalking and
other intimate partner violence is clearly demonstrated by the facts of
Bartunek and supports a foreseeability finding in that case. Moreo-
ver, the link supports a policy decision to impose a duty as a means of
addressing stalking and related intimate partner violence in cases like
Bartunek, where the stalker is a state probationer.
In addition to the strong link between stalking and other violence,
there is a nationwide deficiency in law enforcement's response to
stalking in general:
[M] any criminal justice agencies lack the capacity to provide the comprehen-
sive protection needed by stalking victims, often due to a lack of ... agency
protocols addressing stalking. There is also a general lack of understanding
about the seriousness of the issue. Gaps in responses .. .can result in in-
creased danger for victims.
1 4 5
The Department of Justice encourages training those in the criminal
justice system "about the complexity and potential risks involved in
stalking cases and the efficacy of developing and implementing collab-
orative models to respond more effectively to domestic violence and
stalking."146 The probation department's treatment of Bartunek's
stalking victimization exhibited a lack of understanding, both about
141. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 172204,
STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 15 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 STALKING
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT] (emphasis added). Stalking by intimate part-
ners occurred after the relationship ended in 43% of cases, both before and after
the relationship ended in 36% of cases, and before the relationship ended in 21%
of cases. Id. at 10, 11 exhib.8.
142. Id. at 12, 13 exhib.11.
143. Id. at 14.
144. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
145. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 186157, STALK-
ING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS 28 (2001).
146. 1998 STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 60.
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the link between stalking and domestic violence and about the seri-
ousness of stalking. The need for appropriate responses to stalking
and domestic violence further supports imposing a duty on the State.
A duty would provide an incentive for the State to assure that law
enforcement officers are adequately trained on stalking and related
intimate partner violence and that injury inflicted by state probation-
ers is curtailed.
The toll of intimate partner violence and other violence against wo-
men is tremendous. Physical injuries accompany violence against wo-
men at high rates.147 Risk of physical injury for sexual assaults:
[Ilncreased for female rape victims if the perpetrator was a current or former
intimate partner, if the rape occurred in the victim's or perpetrator's home, if
the rape was completed, if the perpetrator threatened to harm or kill the vic-
tim or someone close to the victim, if the perpetrator used a weapon, and if the
perpetrator used drugs and/or alcohol at the time of the rape. 1 48
Physical injury is only one aspect of the harm of rape. The prevalence
of posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD")149 "among victims of rape or
other sexual violence" has been shown to be as high as 70%.150 One
study found PTSD rates among rape victims to be 31%, and based on
147. FINDINGS FROM THE NVAW SURVEY, supra note 2, at 49.
148. Id. at 50.
149. According to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV),
The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the develop-
ment of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme trau-
matic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that
involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to
one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, in-
jury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning
about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or
injury experienced by a family member or other close associate (Crite-
rion Al). The person's response to the event must involve intense fear,
helplessness, or horror... (Criterion A2). The characteristic symptoms
resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include persistent
reexperiencing of the traumatic event (Criterion B), persistent avoidance
of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general respon-
siveness (Criterion C), and persistent symptoms of increased arousal
(Criterion D). The full symptom picture must be present for more than 1
month (Criterion E), and the disturbance must cause clinically signifi-
cant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning (Criterion F).
Traumatic events that are experienced directly include, but are not
limited to, military combat, violent personal assault (sexual assault,
physical attack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, being taken hos-
tage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a
concentration camp, natural or manmade disasters, severe automobile
accidents, or being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994).
150. SANDRA L. BLOOM, THE PVS DISASTER: POVERTY, VIOLENCE AND SUBSTANCE
ABUSE IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 64 (2002) [hereinafter THE PVS
DISASTER].
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this percentage, at least 26,000 of the estimated 84,000 Nebraska wo-
men who have been forcibly raped in their lifetimes have also devel-
oped PTSD at some time in their lives.151 In addition to her physical
injuries, DaNell Bartunek suffered from PTSD after Piper sexually as-
saulted her at knifepoint.
15 2
Violence against women too often ends in homicide. In 1991, 28%
"of all female murder victims in the United States were slain by their
husbands or boyfriends and in fact, family violence kills as many
[U.S.] women every five years as the total number of Americans who
died in the Vietnam War."' 5 3 Recent figures indicate that 33% of fe-
male murder victims are killed by an intimate partner. 15 4 Data from
the National Crime Victimization Survey and the FBI's Uniform
Crime Reporting Program show that, of the nearly 2,000 murders by
intimate partners in 1996, almost three out of four involved a woman
victim.15 5 One local study revealed that indicators and predictors in
domestic violence homicides and serious injury cases from other juris-
dictions were also present at high rates in Omaha, Nebraska.
15 6 Fur-
ther, many of the risk factors found to be prevalent in the Omaha
domestic violence homicide cases were also present in Bartunek, in-
cluding: multiple calls for assistance; stalking; prior domestic vio-
lence; escalating abuse; multiple domestic violence incidents reported
to criminal justice authorities; the assailant's history of violent crimes
including weapons, chronic or extensive criminal behavior, and proba-
tion; probation violations; the victim trying to leave or separate; wor-
ried family members; a child being involved in violent incidents; and a
151. RAPE IN NEBRASKA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
152. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 458, 666 N.W.2d at 439.
153. THE PVS DISASTER, supra note 150, at 56 (emphasis added).
154. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197838, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, at 1 (2003) ("1,247 women and 440 men were killed by an
intimate partner in 2000. In recent years, an intimate killed about 33% of female
murder victims and 4% of male murder victims."); see also NAT'L CENTER FOR
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2003)
[hereinafter CosTs OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE] ("Nearly one-third of female
homicide victims reported in police records are killed by an intimate partner.").
155. 1998 STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 21. Data
from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Supplementary Homicide Reports show
that "1,252 women ages 18 and older were killed by an intimate partner in 1995."
COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 154, at 1.
156. R.K. PIPER & KEVIN M. FASANA, INST. FOR SOC. & ECON. DEV., THE EVALUATION
OF THE COORDINATED RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN OMAHA (PHASE II):
HIGH-RISK CASE REVIEW AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2002) [hereinafter
OMAHA CASE REVIEW]. These indicators and predictors of serious injury and le-
thal domestic violence were analyzed in a study of fifteen domestic homicide and
serious injury cases in Omaha, Nebraska. Id.
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threat by the assailant to injure or kill himself.157 Thus, numerous
risk indicators for further violence and intimate partner homicide
were not only present in Bartunek, but were also known to the State
long before Piper's attack. Moreover, in the United States from 1976
to 1994, the "most commonly used weapon in sexual assault murders
was a knife."158 Bartunek was able to escape death during the knife-
wielding sexual assault by Piper, because she called 911 just before
the attack and the police arrived in time to save her life.
In addition to the tremendous amount of injury and death result-
ing from violence against women, there are significant social and eco-
nomic costs:
The costs of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and stalking exceed $5.8
billion each year, nearly $4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and mental
health care services. The total costs of [intimate partner violence] also include
nearly $0.9 billion in lost productivity from paid work and household chores
for victims of nonfatal [intimate partner violence] and $0.9 billion in lifetime
earnings lost by victims of [intimate partner] homicide.
1 5 9
Given these significant human, social, and economic costs of rape,
sexual assault, stalking, domestic violence, and intimate partner
homicide, the policy choice in Bartunek is an unfortunate one. Prop-
erly addressing the violence against Bartunek by finding the State
owed a duty to her would have benefited her individually. But the
implications of such a decision reach far beyond her case. If a duty to
victims like Bartunek were found, such a policy choice by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court would impact the State's response to violence
against women as a cultural problem. Finding a duty to Bartunek
would have been a critical step toward dealing with this enormous
problem. In particular, imposing a duty would address intimate part-
ner violence when the State has knowledge of and the power to stop
the violence, such as when the perpetrators are men under the State's
control in the probation system.
157. Multiple calls for assistance, stalking, prior domestic violence, and a history of
violent crimes including weapons were present in over 80% of domestic violence
homicide and serious injury cases in the study. Id. at 15 tbl.II.2. The offender
had a chronic or extensive criminal history and a history of probation or parole,
and the victim tried to leave or separate and thought her- or himself to be in
danger in over 73% of the cases reviewed in the study. Id. at 16 tbl.II.2. Escalat-
ing abuse, multiple domestic violence incidents reported to criminal justice au-
thorities, and worried family members were found in 60% of the reviewed cases.
Id. In 40% of the cases, the offender had probation or parole violations and a
child was involved in violent incidents. Id. A threat by the offender to injure or
kill himself was present in 13.3% of the homicides reviewed. Id. at 17 tbl.II.2.
158. SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, supra note 125, at 39. Among sexual assault
murders, a knife was used in 28.5% of the cases, hands and feet were used in
20.2% of the cases, firearms were used in 17% of the cases, a blunt object was
used in 12.6% of the cases, and 21.7% of the cases involved other methods of
murder. Id. at 39 fig.32.
159. COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 154, at 2.
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Consideration of violence against women as a whole is important
in analyzing Bartunek, because it sheds light on the particular facts of
the case and supports a determination of foreseeability. A thorough
foreseeability analysis in Bartunek must begin with an accounting for
the general prevalence and patterns of intimate partner violence prior
to addressing the specific violence against Bartunek. For instance,
the sheer number of rapes in the U.S. and in Nebraska is significant to
a preliminary consideration of the foreseeability of rape and its impact
on finding a duty. As Professor Leslie Bender argues:
A woman is ten times more likely to be raped than to die in a car crash. In
light of this factual data, it seems clearly offensive to say that any rape is
"unforeseeable"-especially since tort law clearly understands car crashes to
be foreseeable and requires caution to guard against them. Even women who
do not know these statistics are trained from their girlhood to understand this
intuitively. Women live their lives always conscious of the threat of rape and
sexual violence. We watch for indicia of sexual danger at all times and govern
many of our actions in relation to our degree of fear and caution. Men gener-
ally are oblivious to this fear. Tort law and foreseeability doctrine must deal
with the concrete reality of women's vulnerability to sexual violence.
... If there is one sure thing we can say about rape in our society, it is that
rape is unfortunately very foreseeable in women's lives.
1 6 0
As the statistics outlined supra indicate, rape is just one form of inti-
mate partner violence. Professor Bender's analysis applies to other
forms of violence in addition to rape-intimate partner violence of all
forms is so prevalent that it is a predictable element of women's lives.
Of course, the general foreseeability of rape and intimate partner
violence is not alone sufficient to support a duty owed by the State to
any particular victim of this violence. Rather, the general foreseeabil-
ity of violence against women is merely a starting point for analysis.
It is a critical starting point, however, because it signals an approach
to duty analysis that takes into account the realities of violence in wo-
men's lives. To support a legal duty, then, the general foreseeability
and dynamics of intimate partner violence must be considered in the
context of a concrete case. Additional case-specific foreseeability in-
dicators are necessary to impose a duty on an entity that has knowl-
edge of the risk of violence to a particular victim.
Bartunek involved a history of incidents of intimate partner vio-
lence perpetrated by Piper, much of which history the State knew
about. Piper engaged in ongoing abuse, stalking, and threats against
Bartunek while he was on probation and under the State's control.
Thus, a fairly typical pattern of intimate partner violence was estab-
lished long before Piper broke into Bartunek's house and sexually as-
saulted her at knifepoint. Most importantly, the established pattern
160. Leslie Bender, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis and Property Manag-
ers' Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313,
322-23 (1993).
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was well known to Piper's probation officer. These facts, in combina-
tion with a general understanding of intimate partner violence, were
enough to find that a more violent attack on Bartunek was foreseeable
to the State prior to the sexual assault. The State failed to take inti-
mate partner violence seriously in its handling of Piper and the risk
he posed to Bartunek. Moreover, by failing to find that the State owed
Bartunek a duty, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed this
approach.
Not only was the attack foreseeable in light of the dynamics of inti-
mate partner violence present in Bartunek, but the State of Nebraska
was also the best cost avoider because of its knowledge of Piper's be-
havior and its control over him, its continuous interactions with an
identifiable victim, and the foreseeability of the harm that occurred
after months of escalating violence. In light of these factors, the State
should have had a duty to act with reasonable care. Instead of requir-
ing State accountability, however, the insolvent intervening criminal
actor was construed as the only responsible party. Professor Mari
Matsuda addresses the effects of "no duty" as follows:
In the law of torts, if a woman is raped, we look to the rapist for recourse.
He is subject to the narrow criminal and civil sanctions of the law. Others in a
position to predict and prevent rape-such as law enforcement officers, parole
boards, landlords, hotel operators, and security firms-are typically absolved
of responsibility. The law calls this "no duty." No duty means that even if
there are reasonable things one could do to prevent rape, the law will not
require the doing of those things. . . . "Look to the rapist," is the law's mythi-
cal remedy offered in response to women's trauma. It is a myth because rap-
ists are rarely apprehended, and when apprehended, are rarely prosecuted
effectively. When sued, the rapists are typically insolvent and unable to pay
damages .... The United States Supreme Court, in nullifying the [civil rem-
edy in the] Violence Against Women Act, has further extended the de facto
immunity for rapists. Yet, we persist in telling women to seek redress from
rapists, not from a system that creates and condones rape. 1 6 1
Bartunek was decided as a duty case, but duty, scope of the risk,
and causation are similar inquiries, especially where the alleged
source of the duty is the foreseeability of harms caused by criminal
actors.162 Piper's assault on Bartunek did not have to happen, and
the State should be held responsible. As Professor Matsuda puts it:
161. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2202-06 (2000).
162. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines this principle in sections 448 and 449:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is
a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although
the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an op-
portunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the
actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized
the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or
crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (emphasis added). Section 449
provides a broader statement of the principle:
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"The presence of another potentially accountable person should not let
everyone else who could have prevented the harm off the hook. Every
effect has multiple causes, and in a responsible society we should iden-
tify as the responsible causes all those that could have made a differ-
ence." 163 The State could have made a difference in Bartunek, and
intervening in cases like Bartunek would reduce intimate partner vio-
lence as a whole. Public policy would be better served if state actors
and the courts addressed violence against women in situations such as
in Bartunek, where there is sufficient case-specific support for a legal
duty. The analysis now turns to sources of such a legal duty.
B. Special Relationships: Duties Grounded in Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 315
Not only are public policy and the social context of appellate cases
to be considered as end results of a duty analysis, they also form parts
of the multifaceted legal analysis of whether a duty should exist. Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Justice Tobriner stated in Dillon v. Legg164 and
again in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California165 that
duty "is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."'166 In Popple by Pop-
ple v. Rose,167 the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Tarasoff ap-
proach to duty analysis. The Popple court analyzed duty based on a
special relationship between a negligent party and a dangerous person
under section 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the con-
text of a parent's duty to control a minor child with dangerous propen-
sities.168 The Popple court stated:
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is
the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such
an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
163. Matsuda, supra note 161, at 2211.
164. 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968).
165. 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
166. Id. (quoting PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964)).
167. 254 Neb. 1, 573 N.W.2d 765 (1998). Popple is the only Nebraska appellate case
that cites Tarasoff in the majority opinion; the only non-majority citation to
Tarasoff in Nebraska caselaw appears in Hamilton v. City of Omaha, 243 Neb.
253, 498 N.W.2d 555 (1993), in a dissent by Justice Lanphier. Coincidentally,
Popple and Hamilton are also the only Nebraska cases that mention section 315
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; see also infra note 179 and accompanying
text.
168. 254 Neb. at 8, 573 N.W.2d at 770. The Popple court found that such a duty is
cognizable in Nebraska, but it was not triggered in that particular case. Id. at 10,
573 N.W.2d at 771. The court declined to find a duty in Popple because the dan-
gerous child's sexually abusive conduct was not a "known, habitual propensity,"
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In analyzing [whether a legal duty exists], we recognize that legal duties
are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in
cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done. "The
statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question-whether
the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's
conduct."
1 6 9
The Popple court went on to discuss the factors important to determin-
ing whether a duty exists under a "risk-utility balancing test."1
7 °
Under Nebraska law, these factors include "the magnitude of the risk,
the public policy considerations, the relationship of the parties, the
nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise
care, and the public policy interest in the proposed solution. Foresee-
ability is also an important factor in establishing a duty."
17 1
Not only does Popple succinctly set forth the basic approach to duty
under Nebraska law, it is also an example of the narrower class of
negligence cases to which Bartunek belongs. The Popple analysis
states Nebraska's approach to duty in the context of a negligence case
that involves the acts of a third party criminal intervenor. Moreover,
it is one of only two Nebraska cases that analyze the same section of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts at issue in Bartunek.
172
Employing the Popple factor analysis generally in the Bartunek
case ought to have resulted in a finding of duty under Nebraska law.
The "relationship of the parties" factor is the primary subject of the
special relationship analyses in this section. The "opportunity and
ability to exercise care" factor is informed by the significant powers
that the probation department has over its probationers, especially
when they are violating the terms of their probation. This factor is
also strong in a pro-duty direction, given the knowledge the State had
both of Piper's generally dangerous propensities and of the specific
ongoing and escalating threat he posed to Bartunek.
While "foreseeability" is an ongoing thread throughout the analysis
presented infra, it is particularly important with regard to Bartunek's
status as an identifiable victim. 173 Foreseeability is also critical in
and therefore the parents could not have been expected to warn potential victims.
Id.
169. Id. at 6, 573 N.W.2d at 769 (citation omitted).
170. Id. at 7, 573 N.W.2d at 769.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. See supra note 167.
173. See infra subsection III.B.l.b. Foreseeability, as it relates to duty and proximate
cause, respectively, has been defined by the Nebraska Supreme Court:
Foreseeability as it impacts duty determinations refers to "the knowl-
edge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. The risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within
the range of apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into
account in determining the existence of the duty to exercise care." . ..
Foreseeability that affects proximate cause, on the other hand, relates to
"the question of whether the specific act or omission of the defendant
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regard to the general nature of Piper's past crimes combined with his
ongoing behavior directed at Bartunek, both of which presented risk
factors for further violence against her as his former intimate partner.
Given the prevalence of rape and other intimate partner violence,
along with Piper's specific escalating violence, his attack on Bartunek
was foreseeable to the State.
The "magnitude of the risk" and the "nature of the attendant risk"
are collectively informed in part by Piper's violent criminal history, in
part by his escalating threats and violence directed at Bartunek and
her children, and in part by the nature of his past and ongoing crimi-
nal behavior as a risk indicator for sexual assault and intimate part-
ner violence. 17 4 Finally, "public policy considerations" and the "public
policy interest in the proposed solution" are powerful pro-duty factors
in light of the epidemic of violence against women in general and the
predictability of the sexual assault against Bartunek in particular.
This brief application of the duty-analysis factors identified in Popple
to the facts of Bartunek indicates the need to look closely at Piper's
known violent and abusive history as he proceeded to batter, stalk,
sexually assault, and terrorize Bartunek and her family while under
the State's control and often with its knowledge.
The policy reasons presented in section III.A supra and the general
factor analysis of duty supra provide a starting point for a more spe-
cific legal analysis of Bartunek. The legal foundations for duty in Bar-
tunek are found in the law of special relationships. Justice Tobriner
noted in Tarasoff that expansion of the list of special relationships al-
lows courts to circumvent the traditional "no duty" rule.175 It has al-
ready been argued supra that such an expansion is critical in cases
like Bartunek in addressing violence against women on a policy level.
However, imposing a narrow duty on a broader class of relationships
would also exhibit sound legal analysis of special relationships. Rea-
sonable expansion of the list of special relationships is exhibited by
cases that go beyond the illustrations found in the Restatement to deal
with current social issues and follow the intent of state legislatures in
curtailing state immunity.17 6 Moreover, connections between the
facts of cases like Bartunek and special relationships already recog-
nized in Nebraska are necessary. 177 Women's experiences with vio-
was such that the ultimate injury to the plaintiff' reasonably flowed
from defendant's breach of duty. . . . Foreseeability in the proximate
cause context relates to remoteness rather than the existence of a duty.
Sharkey v. Bd. of Regents, 260 Neb. 166, 179, 615 N.W.2d 889, 900 (2000) (quot-
ing Knoll v. Bd. of Regents, 258 Neb. 1, 7-8, 601 N.W.2d 757, 763 (1999) (citation
omitted)).
174. See supra section III.A.
175. 551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5 (Cal. 1976).
176. See infra subsection III.B.1.
177. See infra subsection III.B.2.
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lence should be part of the legal analysis itself, not just issues that
noninclusive legal analysis happens to impact on a policy level. As
Professor Leslie Bender argues, "[b]y incorporating knowledge about
the pervasiveness of rape and violence against women in our society,
courts would be compelled to find as a matter of law that there is a
duty to act to prevent the unreasonable risk of rapes by third
persons."1
7s
1. Section 315(a): Toward a More Realistic Definition of "Takes
Charge" and Recognition of the "Identifiable Victim"
The Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed section 315(a) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts for the first time in its discussion of duty
in Bartunek v. State.179 The court used a narrow construction of sec-
tions 315(a) and 319 to hold that the State of Nebraska's probation
department did not have a duty to use reasonable care to control Piper
or protect Bartunek, because there was neither a custodial relation-
ship nor "24-hour-per-day" or "round-the-clock visual supervision" of
Piper, and thus no special relationship giving rise to a duty.1 80 Focus-
ing on the fact that electronic monitoring of an ISP probationer does
not permit general monitoring of the probationer's movements outside
his home, the court did not find the nature of ISP to be sufficient to
create a "takes charge" relationship as that term is used in section
319.181
The Nebraska Supreme Court's analysis of special relationship
duty under section 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
unnecessarily limited in scope in two respects. First, the focus on the
"take charge" relationship as necessarily custodial or involving 24-
hour-per-day supervision was excessively narrow.1 8 2 In Bartunek, the
court had the opportunity to explore important aspects of section
315(a) developed in the law of duty since the decision in Tarasoff.
8 3
Other courts have held that the definition of "takes charge" is not lim-
178. Bender, supra note 160, at 328.
179. 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441. The court stated that it had "not previously
analyzed Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a) (1965), the parameters of which
are further defined by id., § 319." 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441. The only
prior Nebraska appellate cases mentioning section 315 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts are Popple by Popple v. Rose, 254 Neb. 1, 7-8, 573 N.W.2d 765, 770
(1998) (analyzing section 315(a), but in conjunction with section 316 regarding
parental duty to control a minor child), and Hamilton v. City of Omaha, 243 Neb.
253, 259, 498 N.W.2d 555, 560 (1993) (analyzing section 315(b) rather than sec-
tion 315(a)). Hamilton is discussed in subsection III.B.2 infra. See also supra
note 167.
180. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 463, 666 N.W.2d at 442.
181. Id. at 462-63, 666 N.W.2d at 441-42.
182. See infra subsection III.B.1.a; see also Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for
Rehearing at 4-9, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
183. 551 P.2d 334.
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ited to strictly custodial or constant surveillance situations and that
the identifiability of the victim is significant in post-Tarasoff special
relationship duties. Second, the court's analysis of duty under section
315(a) did not even address the fact that this victim was not only fore-
seeable but also precisely identifiable. 18 4 The "identifiable victim" ele-
ment is an integral part of the development of the law of duty under
section 315(a).18 5
a. "Takes Charge" Under Section 319 Should Not Require
Physical Custody or Constant Visual Supervision
Tarasoff was the turning point in the law of duty for situations
covered under section 315(a), where the actor has a special relation-
ship with the dangerous person. 18 6 In October 1969, two months after
Prosenjit Poddar had confided in a psychologist employed by the Cow-
ell Memorial Hospital at the University of California at Berkeley that
he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff, he did so.' 8 7 The campus police
had detained and then released Poddar at the request of the psycholo-
gist.' 8 8 No further action was taken, and no one warned Tarasoff or
her parents of Poddar's threat.' 8 9 Poddar was criminally prosecuted
for murder, and Tarasoffs parents filed suit against the University
arguing negligent failure to warn and negligent failure to confine Pod-
dar. 190 The first decision in the Tarasoff case was rendered in
1974,191 but the California Supreme Court reheard the case and is-
sued another opinion in 1976.192 In the 1976 opinion, there were four
causes of action, but all were rejected except one-failure to warn
Tarasoff or her parents.193 It was on that one cause of action that the
Tarasoff court expanded the concept of duty under section 315(a) and
found that the University could be held liable in Tarasoff's death.1
94
In his analysis of duty in Tarasoff, Justice Tobriner simply stated
that there was a section 315(a) relationship between the University
and Poddar, and he never mentioned section 319 and the "takes
184. See infra subsection III.B.l.b.
185. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 733-34 (Cal. 1980); Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976); Peter F. Lake,
Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 125-35 (1994).
186. See Lake, supra note 185, at 130.
187. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
188. Id. at 339-40.
189. Id. at 340.
190. Id.
191. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974) [Tarasoff I].
192. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334.
193. Id. at 342.
194. Id. at 342, 353. For an extremely detailed account of the facts and procedural
history of Tarasoff, see Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public
Peril Begins" 25 Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 192-200 (2000).
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charge" relationship it specifies. 19 5 This was a remarkable move by
the court, because section 319 provided the only possible special rela-
tionship applicable to the Tarasoff case under a strict reading of sec-
tion 315(a). 19 6 Even though a relationship defined by sections 316
through 319 did not exist in the Tarasoff case, Justice Tobriner relied
on section 315(a) to expand the scope of special relationships that
could create liability.197
The Tarasoff approach to section 319's "take charge" component as
it is incorporated into section 315(a) is in direct contrast to the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's approach in Bartunek. Since analysis of sec-
tion 315(a) in concert with section 319 was an issue of first impression
in Nebraska, the Bartunek court relied on other jurisdictions in its
analysis of "takes charge."198 The Nebraska Supreme Court also
placed heavy emphasis on the two illustrations to section 319, one
about a patient with an infectious disease permitted to leave the hos-
pital, and the other about a "homicidal maniac" permitted to escape
from a sanitarium.' 99 The court stated that these illustrations "make
plain" that a custodial relationship is required by section 319.200
195. 551 P.2d at 343. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text for Restatement
language referring to and defining section 319 and its relationship to section
315(a).
196. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339-40; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 cmt. c
(1965); Lake, supra note 185, at 129-35.
197. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343-44.
198. In its section 315(a) analysis, the Nebraska Supreme Court relied on the follow-
ing cases, which denied a duty in probation or parole settings: Seibel v. City and
County of Honolulu, 602 P.2d 532 (Haw. 1979); Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d
663 (Iowa 1989); Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998); Lamb v. Hop-
kins, 492 A.2d 1297 (Md. 1985); Humphries v. N.C. Department of Correction, 479
S.E.2d 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Do Mun Kim v. Multnomah County, 970 P.2d 631
(Or. 1998); Small v. McKennan Hospital, 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987); Fox v. Cus-
tis, 372 S.E.2d 373 (Va. 1988). Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 462, 666 N.W.2d
435, 442 (2003). This is the list of cases cited in support of not finding a section
315(a) duty based on a special relationship between Piper and the State. How-
ever, two of them should be removed from the list, because they do not really
present holdings on this type of duty. Fitzpatrick collapses sections 315(a) and
315(b) by discussing reliance by the victim (which fits under 315(b) instead) and
holds that there was no duty to control a parolee because, in the cases it ana-
lyzed, a "much closer nexus existed between the injured parties and agents of the
state . . . than has been shown to exist between the present plaintiffs and the
affected state agencies." 439 N.W.2d at 667 (emphasis added). Humphries does
not address a special relationship between the State and the probationer either.
It discusses only special relationships where the agency and the injured party
have a relationship and where there is detrimental reliance. 479 S.E.2d at 28.
Both of those situations fit under section 315(b) and not section 315(a). See infra
subsection III.B.2.
199. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441-42; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 319 cmt. a, illus. 1 & 2 (1965).
200. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 441. For an analysis of section 315(a)
and an emphasis on custody similar to that in Bartunek, see Nasser v. Parker,
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However, Tarasoff and cases in other jurisdictions that have extended
Tarasoff demonstrate an expansion of the scope of section 315(a) to
include special relationships between dangerous persons and negli-
gent parties that fall outside those described by the comment to sec-
tion 319.
An analysis by Professor Peter F. Lake of Justice Tobriner's omis-
sion of any discussion of section 319 in his Tarasoff opinion is
instructive:
Perhaps [Tobriner's avoidance of section 319] is because that section contains
a hint of ambiguity, namely, that one must "control" a third person whom one
has merely taken "charge" of. This ambiguity suggests that expanding the
traditional list of special relationships remains a possibility, assuming taking
charge means something less than taking control. Furthermore, the "rule" set
forth in section 319 is noticeably broader than its illustrations.2 0 1
Professor Lake emphasizes that, while the therapists in Tarasoff did
not take charge of or commit Poddar, "it is more accurate to say that
the therapists were in a position to take charge if necessary,"202 and
that that position to take charge was the source of their duty.
The view that a custodial relationship is not what is meant by
"takes charge" is also found in caselaw from other jurisdictions relied
on by Bartunek. 20 3 These cases also show that the power to take con-
trol has been used as a basis for duty in cases outside the psychiatric
setting and in the noncustodial law enforcement settings of parole and
probation. The Bartunek court did not address these cases from other
jurisdictions, which illustrate the Tarasoff approach to "takes charge."
However, analysis of a few of these cases will illustrate a sound legal
basis for imposing a duty to Bartunek under section 315(a).
455 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1995) (holding that a psychotherapist had no duty to warn
the intended victim of his patient, who had threatened to kill the victim, that the
patient had left an institution and was at large, because there was no custodial
relationship). In Nasser, the Virginia Supreme Court specifically rejected
Tarasoff on the basis that there was no custodial relationship in Tarasoff to trig-
ger application of section 315(a) via section 319. Id. at 505-06. This explicit re-
jection of Tarasoff is the first such decision by "any court of last resort." Peter
Lake, Virginia Is Not Safe for "Lovers"." The Virginia Supreme Court Rejects
Tarasoff in Nasser v. Parker, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (1995). The Nasser
court also relied on Fox, 372 S.E.2d 373, a parole case that the Nebraska Su-
preme Court cited in Bartunek. Nasser, 455 S.E.2d at 504-06; see Bartunek, 266
Neb. at 462, 666 N.W.2d at 442. For a critique of the Nasser opinion and its
reliance on the lack of section 319 analysis in Tarasoff, see generally Lake, supra
note 185.
201. Lake, supra note 185, at 130 (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Div. of Corr. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121, 1125-26 (Alaska 1986); Sterling
v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755 (Idaho 1986); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985);
Hertog v. City of Seattle, 979 P.2d 400, 403 (Wash. 1999); Taggart v. State, 822
P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992).
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In Division of Corrections v. Neakok,204 the Supreme Court of
Alaska relied on Tarasoff and section 315 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in considering whether the State of Alaska owed any duty to
the victims of its violent parolee to use due care in supervision. In
Neakok, a violent parolee who had been in prison for assault and rape
"shot and killed his teenaged stepdaughter and her boyfriend, and
raped, beat and strangled to death another woman" six months after
his release from prison "while highly intoxicated." 20 5 The parolee had
a history of violence and substance abuse related violence, including
other rapes, beating his wife, and attempted rape of his stepdaughter
while drunk. 206 Prior to release, a prison counselor expressed concern
to the Parole Board and other staff members that the parolee would
have "trouble with drinking after his release" and that he "would be a
particular danger to his stepdaughters, whom he had apparently pre-
viously assaulted while drunk."20 7 Nevertheless, the parolee was sub-
ject to only the minimum parole conditions, and no plan for parole was
developed even though state policy required a plan based on his re-
cord. 208 Neither the prison counselor nor the parole officer imposed
special conditions of parole even though both were authorized to do
S0.209
Following the murders, the families of the victims sued the State of
Alaska and the Parole Board for, among other things, negligent super-
vision and failure to impose adequate conditions of parole. 2 10 The
court found a duty to use due care in supervision of the parolee.211 In
response to the State's argument that "actual custody" or a negligent
release from custody is required to trigger a duty, the court held that a
"duty to control or warn can[not] be so narrowly limited."2 12 The
court's analysis focused on the ability of the State to control the pa-
rolee, namely that it could "regulate his movements within the state,
require him to report to a parole officer .... require him to undergo
treatment for alcoholism, and impose and enforce special conditions of
parole."2 13 The State also had authority to revoke parole and rein-
carcerate the parolee for violation of parole conditions.2 14 These pow-
ers are much like those that the ISP probation officers in Bartunek
204. 721 P.2d at 1125-26.
205. Id. at 1123.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1124.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1126-32.
212. Id. at 1126.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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possessed. 215 The Neakok court emphasized that "[w]hile the state
could not completely control [the parolee's] conduct, it was hardly in
the position of a stranger who (at least according to the traditional
rule) cannot be expected to interfere with the conduct of a third per-
son."216 The court went on to say that parole itself was not the only
basis for the special relationship, but rather that the known dangers
the parolee posed were significant to the State's "enhanced ability" to
control the parolee. 2 17 The special relationship was thus based on the
State's "substantial ability to control the parolee" as well as its "in-
creased ability to foresee the dangers the [particular] parolee
pose[dl."218 The Neakok court analogized this special relationship to
that found in Tarasoff and several other noncustodial and law enforce-
ment cases. 2
19
The ability to control the parolee was also significant in defining
"takes charge" in the State of Washington's Taggart v. State.220 In
Taggart, two cases (Taggart v. State and Sandau v. State) were com-
bined for review. 22 1 In Taggart, a woman was attacked by a parolee
with a violent juvenile and adult criminal history dating back at least
fifteen years. 22 2 The parolee's crimes included first degree burglary,
two attempted rapes, assault with intent to commit rape, assault, auto
theft, driving while intoxicated, and resisting arrest, all of which in-
volved alcohol abuse. 2 23 The Taggart assault occurred seven months
after the parolee's third release from prison. The parolee received
very little supervision from his parole officer-and had more supervi-
sion occurred, his heavy drinking in violation of parole would likely
have been discovered. 22 4
In the Sandau case, a parolee with a violent juvenile and adult
criminal history repeatedly raped the nine-year-old son of his girl-
friend. 22 5 The parolee had been in prison for stabbing a man in the
215. See supra note 4.
216. 721 P.2d at 1126.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1127 (citing, along with Tarasoff, Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d
462 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (acknowledging duty in parole supervision); Semler v. Psy-
chiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (acknowledging that a
probation officer had a duty to report to the sentencing court a hospital's release
of probationer known to be dangerous to young girls); and Petersen v. State, 671
P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983) (acknowledging state hospital was responsible for control-
ling dangerous propensities of patient)).
220. 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992).
221. Id. at 244.
222. Id. at 245.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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chest, and was "usually intoxicated" when committing his crimes. 22 6
His parole officer received reports that the parolee was drinking and
threatening his ex-wife's husband, but did no follow-up. 227 The "maxi-
mum supervision" parolee did not report to his parole officer for over
three months. 228 A warrant for the missing parolee was issued but
not recorded, and the officer later learned that he was two states away
in Montana, beating his girlfriend and her children and drinking
heavily. 2 29 Due to administrative delays, he remained free long
enough to rape the victim. 230
In the consolidated cases, the Taggart court considered what duty
the State owed the victims, and in doing so held that the features of
the parole setting, including powers to regulate parolees' movements
within the state borders, to require reporting to the parole officer, to
impose special conditions such as drug and alcohol testing and rehab,
and to order the parolee not to possess firearms, were sufficient to
meet the "takes charge" definition found in section 319 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts and applied to section 315(a). 23 1 Also, the re-
quirements that parole officers know of their parolees' criminal
histories and that progress during parole be monitored provided an
additional basis for finding a duty to control the parolee. 2 32 The court
held that "[wihen a parolee's criminal history and progress during pa-
role show that the parolee is likely to cause bodily harm to others if
not controlled, the parole officer is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to control the parolee and to prevent him or her from doing such
harm."2 33 The Taggart court emphasized that a custodial relationship
is not the determining factor. Citing Tarasoff, it pointed out that in
that case, a duty was imposed in regard to an outpatient, not an inpa-
tient or custodial ward, and that the outpatient status was analogous
to parole or probation settings. 2 34
226. Id. at 246.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 255.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 257. The outpatient mental health scenario, similar to that in Tarasoff,
has been the subject of recent duty analyses as well. For example, in Rivera v.
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), the court specifically relied on sections 315 and 319 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as adopted under New York law in holding that mental health
providers were liable for an attempted murder and assault committed by a para-
noid schizophrenic with a history of violence. The patient was undergoing outpa-
tient care at the time of the attack. Id. at 417. The court held that, while the
duty may be lessened in an outpatient setting, it does not "disappear." Id. at 420.
Significantly, the court based its holding on the 'ability to control" the outpatient,
which in this case included an option to seek commitment. Id. at 422. Seeking
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While Neakok and Taggart found a duty in the outpatient-like pa-
role setting, other cases demonstrate application of this analysis to
probation settings as well. 23 5 In Hertog, ex rel. S.A.H. v. City of Seat-
tle,2 3 6 the Supreme Court of Washington extended its Taggart analy-
sis to a probation case to find a duty, again relying on sections 315(a)
and 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.23 7 In Hertog, the court
found that the probation counselor had a duty to use reasonable care
to control the probationer. 238 The probationer in Hertog was a repeat
sexual offender and chronic drug and alcohol abuser.2 39 The City was
sued for negligent supervision of the probationer who, after consum-
ing alcohol and cocaine, raped a six-year-old girl in her home while on
probation for a lewd conduct conviction and on pretrial release await-
ing charges in a sexually motivated burglary. 24 0 At the time of the
rape, the probation officer, who knew of the probationer's violent ten-
dencies and violations of probation, planned to wait six months to
meet with the probationer; the rape occurred within this six-month
gap in supervision.2 4 1 In Hertog, both the probation and pretrial re-
lease counselors with supervisory authority were held to have a duty
to "protect others from reasonably foreseeable danger resulting from
the dangerous propensities of probationers and pretrial releasees
under their supervision."
24 2
Other states have adopted an analysis similar to that in Alaska
and Washington and have found a "takes charge" duty in negligent
commitment is analogous to reporting probation violations to a sentencing court
to institute a revocation hearing, so this reasoning would apply to the construc-
tion of "takes charge" as meaning "ability to control" advocated supra for the Bar-
tunek case.
235. In Nebraska, "[p]robation means a sentence under which a person found guilty of
a crime upon verdict or plea or adjudicated delinquent or in need of special super-
vision is released by a court subject to conditions imposed by the court and sub-
ject to supervision." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2246(4) (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp.
2002). In contrast, "[plarole term shall mean the time from release [from prison]
on parole to the completion of the maximum term, reduced by good time." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-170(11) (Reissue 1999).
236. 979 P.2d 400, 403 (Wash. 1999).
237. Id. at 406-07.
238. Id. at 406-09.
239. Id. at 404.
240. Id. at 403.
241. Id. at 405.
242. Id. at 415. For other examples of Washington cases affirming a duty to use rea-
sonable care in supervision, see Bell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002) (acknowl-
edging duty in a case of an abduction and rape by a paroled sex offender), Bishop
v. Miche, 973 P.2d 465 (Wash. 1999) (acknowledging duty in a case of an automo-
bile accident death caused by intoxicated probationer on probation for driving
while intoxicated), and Savage v. State, 899 P.2d 1270 (Wash. 1995) (acknowledg-
ing duty in a case of a rape by a felon parolee with a history of sexual assaults
and violence).
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supervision cases as well. 2 43 The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected
this view. 2 44 While it was the court's prerogative to accept or reject
inclusion of probation in a "takes charge" duty, finding such a duty
implements a clearly preferable public policy. Furthermore, other ju-
risdictions clearly demonstrate the legal analysis required for this
duty, which takes into account the foreseeability of sexualized violence
by certain parolees and probationers.
In addition to the support from other jurisdictions, there is rele-
vant Nebraska caselaw supporting an alternative outcome in Bar-
tunek on the "takes charge" issue. The Bartunek decision, which
requires "24-hour-per-day supervision" to trigger a duty and narrowly
interprets "takes charge" under section 319, contradicts caselaw hold-
ing the State of Nebraska accountable for negligent failure to control a
dangerous third party.2 45 For example, in Sherrod v. State,246 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court affirmed a finding of liability against the Ne-
braska Department of Correctional Services under the State Tort
Claims Act for a beating inflicted on a prisoner by a former cellmate.
The attacking inmate was not supervised "24-hours-per-day" even
though incarcerated in the Nebraska State Penitentiary. 247
243. See Sterling v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755 (Idaho 1986) (adopting section 319 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and allowing liability where probationer convicted
of a third drunk driving offense was repeatedly in violation of both drinking and
driving probation terms without having been reported to the court when he
caused extensive injuries in another drunk driving incident), supersession by stat-
ute as to new government immunity except in cases of reckless, willful, and wanton
conduct recognized in Harris v. State, 847 P.2d 1156 (Idaho 1992) (holding that
paroled juvenile's violent sexual assault could have resulted in state liability only
to the extent that these acts were foreseeable and predictable); Doe v. Arguelles,
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) (finding state liability in rape, sodomy, and stabbing of
child by inadequately supervised youth sexual offender on parole). Arizona has
recognized the viability of a duty in probation settings in two cases where duty
was not at issue. See McCleafv. State, 945 P.2d 1298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (find-
ing that liability for gross negligence was possible but not applicable because rev-
ocation action had been taken by probation officer, albeit later than may have
been necessary, and the decision was up to the judge, so there was no proximate
cause); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Dep't, 690 P.2d 38 (Ariz. 1984)
(finding that negligent supervision of probationer was possible in case where pro-
bation officer did not enforce the court's probation order).
244. See Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 463, 666 N.W.2d 435, 442 (2003).
245. See Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 4-5, Bartunek (No. S-
02-0710) (highlighting the cases discussed infra that Bartunek potentially
overturns).
246. 251 Neb. 355, 366, 557 N.W.2d 634, 641 (1997).
247. Sherrod, 251 Neb. at 356, 557 N.W.2d at 636. Another case similar to Sherrod is
Webber v. Andersen, 187 Neb. 9, 187 N.W.2d 290 (1971) (finding that Omaha Po-
lice had a duty to control three violent inmates in a city jail who assaulted an-
other inmate despite not being visually supervised 24-hours-per-day).
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At the other extreme from the prison setting in terms of supervi-
sion, Sharkey v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska
248 held
that the University of Nebraska at Omaha owed a duty to and could
be found liable for the injuries sustained by an invitee, which were
inflicted by an unknown third party assailant in a known dangerous
area of campus. Since the Sharkey duty was based on foreseeability
and the landowner-invitee relationship, it is not directly analogous to
Bartunek. However, Sharkey represents a case where the State was
liable for injuries inflicted by someone over whom it had much less
control (next to none) than it had over Piper and where foreseeability
was more generalized than it was in Bartunek. Sharkey involved the
foreseeability of criminal activity in remote, dark places involving un-
known victims and unknown assailants, whereas Bartunek involved
the foreseeability of escalating intimate partner violence by a perpe-
trator under the State's control against an identifiable victim. Fi-
nally, in Brandon v. County of Richardson,2 49 the duty the court found
was based on the special relationship created by the crime witness
status of the victim. Although not directly analogous to Bartunek,
Brandon does represent yet another case where there was less than
24-hour visual supervision and where the County had much less con-
trol over the at large assailants than the State had over Piper in Bar-
tunek, yet where the court nevertheless imposed a duty.
The result of Bartunek in light of these other supervisory situa-
tions is that there seems to be no case that could possibly meet the 24-
hour-per-day visual supervision test, no matter how foreseeable the
attack.2 50 A better legal standard would focus on the ability to control
the third person or the ability to take control if needed. Indeed, this is
the standard implicit in the findings of liability in the Nebraska cases
of Sherrod, Sharkey, and Brandon.25 1 Such a standard would effec-
tively serve public policy interests in addressing intimate partner vio-
lence committed by Nebraska probationers against identifiable
victims. ISP officers have the ability as well as the duty to know
where a probationer is 24-hours-per-day through the use of an elec-
tronic monitoring device. 2 52 ISP officers can make arrests with
broader powers than the police have. 253 ISP officers can and should
248. 260 Neb. 166, 182, 615 N.W.2d 889, 902 (2000).
249. 252 Neb. 839, 566 N.W.2d 776 (1997) [Brandon I]. For the facts of Brandon and
the law of duty it established, see subsection III.B.2.b infra.
250. See Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 5, Bartunek (No. S-02-
0710).
251. See id.
252. See supra note 4.
253. See supra note 4. For a description of the ISP program, see Bartunek, 266 Neb. at
455, 66 N.W.2d at 437.
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take control of those violent probationers who pose risks for sexual
assault and intimate partner violence.254
b. A Section 315(a) Duty Should Recognize the "Identifiable
Victims" of Nebraska's Probationers
In addition to the options for interpreting the meaning of "takes
charge" discussed supra, cases from other jurisdictions that have re-
lied on section 315(a) provide insight into the importance of the "iden-
tifiable victim" factor in constructing "duty." The Nebraska Supreme
Court did not address the glaring reality that DaNell Bartunek was
clearly an identifiable victim. This fact sets Bartunek apart from each
and every case upon which the Nebraska Supreme Court relied in de-
nying a duty based on a special relationship between the State and
Piper.25 5 Since there is to date no Nebraska caselaw discussing "iden-
tifiable victims," analysis must depend on other jurisdictions' use of
this factor in constructing duty.
None of the cases from other jurisdictions that the Nebraska Su-
preme Court cited in its section 315(a) analysis in Bartunek involved
an identifiable victim. Even where cases cited by the Bartunek court
involved a potentially identifiable class of victims, the class was very
254. While there are general distinctions between regular probation and ISP relating
to the level of control and dangerousness of the probationer, see supra note 4, the
purpose of this Note is to argue for a duty in cases where a probationer is danger-
ous, regardless of the type of probation. Of course, the heightened controls an
officer has in the ISP program speak to how much ability to control exists for
purposes of a "takes charge" analysis. Nevertheless, probation orders themselves
define certain levels of control in differing degrees, and each probation order is
tailored to the probationer. Similarly, each probationer presents a unique set of
dangerousness factors. Since ability to control the probationer and dangerous-
ness are the critical elements the duty advocated here, they should be applied
according to the facts of a specific case. The same legal and policy reasons that
support a duty in ISP cases may support a duty in regular probation cases as
well.
255. The Nebraska Supreme Court relied on the following cases, which denied a duty
in probation or parole settings: Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu, 602 P.2d
532 (Haw. 1979) (involving a potentially identifiable class of women who could
become victims of sex offender); Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1989)
(involving no identifiable victim in contrast to the general public); Schmidt v.
HTG, Inc., 961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998) (involving a potentially identifiable class of
women who could come into contact with violent sex offender); Lamb v. Hopkins,
492 A.2d 1297 (Md. 1985) (involving a potentially identifiable class of potential
drivers on the roads who could be hurt by drunk driver); Humphries v. N.C. De-
partment of Correction, 479 S.E.2d 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (involving no connec-
tion between assailant and shooting victims); Do Mun Kim v. Multnomah County,
970 P.2d 631 (Or. 1998) (involving a potentially identifiable class of convenience
store owners and employees who could be robbed or hurt by robber); Small v.
McKennan Hospital, 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987) (involving a random victim);
Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373 (Va. 1988) (involving a potentially identifiable class
of women who could be raped and victims of arson by prior violent sex offender).
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large-nothing close to the identifiable status of Bartunek.
25 6 Instead
of addressing the identifiability of Bartunek, the court focused solely
on the distinction between custody and probation and the lack of 24-
hour-per-day visual supervision.2 57 The result of this choice by the
court is, regrettably, that it failed to address implications for con-
structing a duty grounded in an awareness of identifiable victims.
258
In Tarasoff, the doctor-patient relationship between the defendant
and Poddar was enough to create the special relationship necessary to
support a duty owed to Tarasoff.25 9 Justice Tobriner stated that "by
entering into a doctor-patient relationship the therapist becomes suf-
ficiently involved to assume some responsibility for the safety, not
only of the patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doc-
tor knows to be threatened by the patient."26 0 The duty was further
explained:
In our view ... once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient
poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reason-
able care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger. While the discharge
of this duty of due care will necessarily vary with the facts of each case, in
each instance the adequacy of the therapist's conduct must be measured
against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care
under the circumstances.
2 6 1
Thus, the Tarasoff court imposed on the defendant a duty to use rea-
sonable care; custody or other means of "taking charge" were not nec-
essary, because the victim was foreseeable.
26 2
Tarasoff itself did not use the term "identifiable victim." Moreover,
Tarasoff did not require the victim to be precisely identified, even
though the victim there had been identified: "[Tlhere may also be
cases in which a moment's reflection will reveal the victim's identity.
The matter thus is one which depends upon the circumstances of each
case, and should not be governed by any hard and fast rule."26
3 How-
ever, the requirement was developed in Thompson v. County of Ala-
meda264 to become more definite: "Although the intended victim as a
precondition to liability need not be specifically named, he must be
'readily identifiable."' 2 6 5 Other courts have similarly so held. For ex-
256. See supra note 255.
257. See Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462-64, 666 N.W.2d at 441-43 (discussing section
315(a)).
258. See id.
259. 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976).
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 345-46.
262. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343-44.
263. Id. at 345 n.11.
264. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
265. Id. at 734 (referring to the description of the victim in Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341).
See also Lake, supra note 185, at 133 n.208. For a historical analysis of Tarasoff
and its progeny on the issue of the identifiable victim, see D.L. Rosenhan et al.,
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ample, the Utah Supreme Court held that there must be an identifi-
able "individual or distinct group of individuals" to limit the scope of
duty while still requiring reasonable care when danger is foreseeable
and meaningful action can be taken.2 66
While the Alaska Supreme Court in Neakok analyzed "takes
charge" issues to find a duty, as discussed supra, it also moved on to
address foreseeability as an element of that duty.2 6 7 The Neakok
court stated that since preventing harm to the public was a purpose of
the parole system, danger to the public would be a foreseeable out-
come of negligence. 26 s The court relied on Tarasoff and subsequent
cases to address whether the exact identity of the victim had to be
known to trigger the duty, and found that it did not.2 69 The court
went on to hold that the victims were identifiable even though not
specifically so, because they were residents of a small isolated commu-
nity and were family and friends of the assailant.2 70 The Neakok
court relied on Thompson to hold that if the plaintiff could prove that
the victims were in a discrete enough group to be effectively warned of
the danger, there could be a duty. 27 1
Another state case relying on foreseeability analysis is the Massa-
chusetts case of A.L. v. Commonwealth.272 In A.L., a probationer who
had been convicted of child sexual abuse three times was hired and
retained as a Boston public school teacher due to the negligent super-
vision of his probation officer, and two young boys were consequently
molested. 2 73 The court stated that the "most critical factor in this
analysis is whether a defendant could anticipate that he would be ex-
pected to act to protect the plaintiff and could foresee harm to the
Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165, 1173-79
(1993).
266. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993). The Higgins court
also discussed the policy decisions behind constructing a duty with limitations:
[O]ur overriding practical concern is whether the one causing the harm
has shown him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous so that the actor
upon whom the alleged duty would fall can be reasonably expected, con-
sistent with the practical realities of that actor's relationship to the one
in custody or under control, to distinguish that person from others simi-
larly situated, to appreciate the unique threat this person presents, and
to act to minimize or protect against that threat. When such circum-
stances are present, a special relationship can be said to exist and a duty
sensibly may be imposed.
Id. at 237.
267. 721 P.2d 1121, 1127 (Alaska 1986). For the facts of this case, refer to text accom-
panying notes 204-19 supra.
268. 721 P.2d at 1127.
269. Id. at 1129 ("A victim may be 'foreseeable' without being specifically
identifiable.").
270. Id. at 1131.
271. Id. at 1132.
272. 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1021-23 (Mass. 1988).
273. Id. at 1019-23.
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plaintiff resulting from his inaction."27 4 The court then held that con-
ditions imposed by the sentencing judge that required the probationer
to stay away from young boys created the special relationship and a
"duty beyond that owed to the public as a whole."2 75 These orders
were "meaningless without the probation officer's enforcement."
2 76
In Taggart, the Washington Supreme Court also addressed fore-
seeability.27 7 It discussed the parolees' violent history and the bear-
ing that had on propensity to commit the crimes against the
victims. 2 78 One of the parolees "had a history of alcoholism and vio-
lent attacks against women, and a poor prognosis for recovery from his
mental illness."279 The court emphasized that a jury could conclude
that he might commit similar crimes again, and that "[t]he fact that
Taggart herself was not the foreseeable victim of [the parolee's] crimi-
nal tendencies does not establish as a matter of law that her injury
[caused by the attack by the parolee when he was drunk] was not fore-
seeable." 28 0 As to the other parolee, the Taggart court held that the
parolee had an extensive violent history, was in violation of his parole,
was drinking alcohol, which increased the risk of violence, and was
beating his girlfriend and her children. 2 8 ' Thus:
A jury might conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable that unless [the pa-
rolee] were arrested for violating parole, he would commit further violence
against [his girlfriend] or her children, including Sandau [the parolee's rape
victim]. The fact that the violence took the form of raping Sandau, when [the
parolee's] criminal history did not include rape, does not show that injury to
Sandau was not foreseeable. Violence against Sandau may have been foresee-
able, even though the form of that violence may not have been.
2 8 2
Likewise with Bartunek: while Snowardt did not know of Piper's prior
rapes against Bartunek, he did know of prior burglaries by Piper and
domestic violence and stalking by Piper against Bartunek and her
son. The two core offenses the night of the attack were burglary and
sexual assault of a former intimate partner. Snowardt did know of
Piper's violent history, that he was being investigated for a knifing,
and that he was now on probation for a burglary involving possession
of a gun and a knife. Moreover, there was an identifiable victim say-
ing she was worried about the escalating threat.
Thus, Bartunek presents an even stronger case for duty than did
Taggart, Neakok, or A.L., because Bartunek was specifically identifi-
274. Id. at 1021.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1022.
277. 822 P.2d 243, 258 (Wash. 1992). For the facts of Taggart, see text accompanying
notes 220-34 supra.
278. 822 P.2d at 258.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (emphasis added).
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able and had in fact identified herself to the State. Nevertheless, the
Nebraska Supreme Court relied exclusively on cases with weakly
identifiable classes of victims or totally random victims, instead of
looking to caselaw in other jurisdictions analyzing duty in the context
of identifiable victims. 28 3 Use of cases more factually similar to Bar-
tunek to support a duty would have demonstrated a legal analysis cog-
nizant of sexualized violence by probationers against known victims.
In using Tarasoff to inform an analysis of Bartunek, it is important
to note that, while failure to warn the victim or her family was the
basis of the claim in Tarasoff,28 4 the new duty created in Tarasoff was
not defined as a "duty to warn," but rather as a "duty to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger," which is
known or should be known when there is a special relationship be-
tween the defendant and the dangerous third party.28 5 This duty can
be met by a variety of means other than warning. Bartunek clearly
knew of the threat Piper posed to her, so the issue in her case was not
a failure to warn about otherwise unknown threats. The basis of Bar-
tunek's claim was the State's failure to control Piper or revoke proba-
tion on the multiple occasions where it should have-in short, she,
like the plaintiffs in Tarasoff, alleged a failure to use reasonable care
under the circumstances. 28 6
283. See supra note 255. The court listed Neakok and A.L. as standing for cases oppo-
site its ultimate holding, but did not analyze them. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 462,
666 N.W.2d at 442. However, the Bartunek court did not even mention Taggart,
despite the Appellee's thorough analysis of Taggart in her brief. See, e.g., Brief of
Appellee at 30-32, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710). The Appellee also pointed out to
the court that Bartunek was distinguishable from the Taggart plaintiffs, because
she was a "readily identifiable foreseeable victim." Id. at 32.
284. 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
285. Id. at 345; see also Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 739 (Cal. 1980)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) ("Our opinion in Tarasoff makes clear that failure to
warn a victim who is identifiable does not constitute an essential element of the
cause of action. We noted that the duty of care requires the defendant 'to take
one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case.'") (quoting
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340).
286. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the probation
officer knew or should have known that Piper posed a danger to Bartunek, be-
cause it disposed of the case on the duty issue. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 459, 666
N.W.2d at 439 ("The first and only issue that is necessary for us to address is
whether a special relationship existed which gave rise to a specific duty on the
part of the State to protect Bartunek from Piper."); id. at 464, 666 N.W.2d at 443
("Because [the] conclusion [that there was no special relationship and thus no
duty to Bartunek] is dispositive, we need not consider issues relating to breach,
causation, or damages . . . ."). However, the district court clearly found breach,
based on Piper's numerous violations of probation, violent background, and "con-
tinued harassment" of Bartunek. Record at 11-12, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (Dis-
trict Court Journal Entry & J.) (Conclusions of Law and discussion of duty to
Bartunek). The district court emphasized that it was the harassment "of the
Plaintiff" that made the State's behavior negligent, thus emphasizing her foresee-
able and identifiable character. Id. at 12.
269
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There are benefits to the "identifiable victim" element beyond its
acute relevance to the facts in Bartunek. Using this element of section
315(a) would eliminate what the court may have feared to be an ensu-
ing flood of litigation by anyone and everyone hurt by someone on pro-
bation, should it have also found probation sufficient to create a "takes
charge" relationship. Thus, by limiting the duty to identifiable victims
of probationers, regardless of custody or 24-hour-per-day visual super-
vision, the court could easily have found a duty to Bartunek without
allowing unknown or unforeseeable potential victims of Piper to sue as
well. In fact, the Neakok court addressed these concerns, emphasizing
that "recognition of the duty does not make the state liable for all
harm caused by parolees, but rather makes it liable only when its neg-
ligent supervision and administration of their parole causes the injury
in question."2s7
The Bartunek court had multiple legal theories from which to
choose in constructing a duty based on the State's relationship with
Piper, its ability to control him, and the existence of an identifiable
victim. The fact that Bartunek was identifiable provides such an easy
way to limit duty, that it is perplexing that the Nebraska Supreme
Court did not take the opportunity to use it, especially when it relied
solely on cases distinguishable from Bartunek's case on that very
characteristic. An approach even more conservative than relying on
identifiable victims is to also require a pattern of violations of proba-
tion or one serious violation before triggering the State's duty. While
the very actions that make a victim identifiable often will automati-
cally be serious violations of probation (e.g., stalking, violating orders,
breaking curfew to harass, abusing a child), and will often manifest a
pattern, using the status of violating probation in a certain way so as
to define the duty provides yet another guard against expanding po-
tential liability in ways with which the court is not comfortable.
Finally, the cost-benefit analysis in Bartunek underscores the im-
portance of finding a duty in such a case even if one does not fully
embrace a Tarasoff-like analysis of duty in cases where there is no
strict custodial relationship. In Tarasoff, the policy concern in opposi-
tion to finding a duty was of patient confidentiality.288 Justice Tobri-
ner stated:
We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of
mental illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy .... Against
287. 721 P.2d 1121, 1130 (Alaska 1986). Professor Peter F. Lake makes a similar
point: "[Tihe mere recognition of a duty owed does not necessarily mean that lia-
bility will follow; a plaintiff must show breach of that duty, causing compensable
damage, and avoid affirmative defenses." Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in
Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of the
Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy Con-
siderations, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1503, 1509 n.38 (1997).
288. 551 P.2d at 346.
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this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest in safety from vio-
lent assault.
... We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confiden-
tial character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the
extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protec-
tive privilege ends where the public peril begins.2
8 9
Clearly the third party concern in Bartunek is not that of confidential-
ity, because Bartunek already knew Piper was a threat to her. Moreo-
ver, confidentiality would not be an issue in probation settings,
because there is no patient-therapist relationship between probation-
ers and probation officers. The costs of a duty to the State in cases
like Bartunek would be merely economic and administrative. One as-
pect of these costs would require the court to partake in revocation
proceedings more often. Another aspect involves the cost of litigation
in cases where the facts less clearly fit with any duty the State has
defined. A third would be the cost of liability where that duty is
breached, causing damages to victims.
These economic and administrative burdens are not nonexistent
costs. However, they must be compared to the social cost presented in
Bartunek where someone was sexually assaulted and almost killed.
Weighed against that counter-consideration, the costs of revocation
hearings for dangerous felons in violation of the terms of ISP is mini-
mal. Under the duty advocated for supra, the probationer would al-
ready have done enough to face a revocation hearing, and it would be
up to the court to decide what would happen next-either maintaining
the probation with more restrictions or, alternatively, revoking it and
ordering incarceration. 29 0 The violations Piper had accumulated were
not trivial ones, were increasingly serious, and were often directed at
the identifiable victim, who was violently sexually attacked after the
State refused to deal with its probationer's violations. This situation
is much more clear-cut than the nebulous task of negotiating patient
confidentiality concerns into a duty. The breach in Bartunek was that
the State did not give the sentencing court a chance to look at the case,
by not taking Piper before a judge to discuss his violations and his
escalating violent behavior toward Bartunek. Once there is a duty,
the cost of lawsuits in less clear cases would decrease as the appellate
289. Id. at 346-47.
290. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2267 (Reissue 1995) (providing for the procedure for
probation revocation hearings); Id. § 29-2268 (providing for the range of options
the court has following a finding that a probationer has violated a probation con-
dition, including revocation of probation and imposition of a new sentence, repri-
mand and warning, intensified supervision, additional probation requirements,
or an extension of the term of probation). A single violation is sufficient to justify
revocation of probation. State v. Clark, 197 Neb. 42, 47, 246 N.W.2d 657, 660
(1976). A court is required to find a violation of probation by clear and convincing
evidence. State v. Finnegan, 232 Neb. 75, 77, 439 N.W.2d 496, 498 (1989).
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courts face new fact patterns and establish lines of demarcation that
can be applied by trial courts. It is true that the cost of state liability
to victims could be great, but the remedy for this is competent proba-
tion supervision, not elimination of a remedy for victims.
In summary, the State of Nebraska had the power to control Piper
and chose not to. It had the power to arrest and hold, which it used,
too late, the night of the attack on Bartunek, and the power to insti-
tute revocation proceedings, which it failed to use throughout the
summer of 1997. Section 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides ample basis for imposing a duty on the State to protect Bar-
tunek by controlling Piper. The fact that ISP provides a level of "takes
charge" involvement sufficient to put the State in a special relation-
ship with Piper supports this duty. Even if the court would maintain
its view that lack of custody or 24-hour-per-day visual supervision is
insufficient to create a "takes charge" relationship alone, probation, or
more specifically, ISP, could be the basis of a "takes charge" relation-
ship anyway in cases where there is an identifiable victim like Bar-
tunek. All of the foregoing options for imposing a 315(a) duty better
address the reality of intimate partner and sexualized violence in pro-
bation cases than what is possible under a "no duty" regime.
2. Section 315(b): Toward a More Reasonable Construction of
"Detrimental Reliance" and Recognition of
"Aid-to-the-State"
Not only are there opportunities to find a duty to DaNell Bartunek
under section 315(a), there are also sufficient opportunities under sec-
tion 315(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and existing Nebraska
caselaw consistent with section 315(b). The Nebraska Supreme Court
analyzed Bartunek's case under section 315(b) according to precedent
in Nebraska, but did so incompletely, thus leading to an incorrect find-
ing of "no duty." It set forth the general rule, as stated in Morgan v.
District of Columbia29' and adopted by Nebraska in Brandon v.
County of Richardson.292 The Bartunek court quoted from Brandon I:
"We recognize that there are situations that provide exceptions to the
no-duty rule: (1) where individuals who have aided law enforcement
as informers or witnesses are to be protected or (2) where the police
have expressly promised to protect specific individuals from precise
harm."29 3 Regarding these exceptions, the Bartunek court explained
that there is no special relationship just because an individual re-
quests assistance from the police; nor is there a special relationship
291. 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983).
292. 252 Neb. 839, 843-44, 566 N.W.2d 776, 780 (1997) [Brandon I]; accord Brandon
v. County of Richardson, 261 Neb. 636, 624 N.W.2d 604 (2001) [Brandon III.
293. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 460, 666 N.W.2d 435, 440 (2003) (quoting Bran-
don I, 252 Neb. at 843-44, 566 N.W.2d at 780).
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when the police gratuitously promise to provide protection. 29 4 The
court cited Hamilton v. City of Omaha29 5 in stating that there is a
special relationship when the "police do not benefit from a citizen's aid
but nevertheless affirmatively act to protect a specific individual or a
specific group of individuals from harm, in such a way as to engender
particularized and justifiable reliance."296 The Bartunek court held
that these principles apply to probation officers as well as police of-
ficers and that "more than general reliance is needed" to trigger the
duty when there is no aid to the State but there has been an undertak-
ing to protect. 29
7
The Nebraska Supreme Court's analysis of section 315(b) focused
solely on the detrimental reliance aspect of duty, and dismissed any
duty based on Bartunek aiding the State. This analytical choice is
inadequate in two respects. First the court chose a legal construction
of the detrimental reliance duty that focused only on the night of the
attack, where assurances were made to Bartunek's father but were
not made to Bartunek personally. 298 In doing so, the court failed to
recognize the factual element of ongoing reliance that Bartunek
placed in Piper's probation officer. The second flaw in the court's anal-
ysis is its dismissal of the aid-to-the-state legal theory under Brandon
and failure to apply that legal theory to the facts of Bartunek.
29 9
a. "Detrimental Reliance" Under Section 315(b) Now Collides
with Contributory Negligence in Nebraska
The Nebraska Supreme Court's analysis of section 315(b) as to det-
rimental reliance focused on a narrow aspect of the Bartunek case.
The court emphasized only the night of the attack and thereby dis-
missed all previous reliance by DaNell Bartunek, which had occurred
during the months she interacted with Piper's probation officer
Snowardt. The court was thus able to avoid imposing a duty, empha-
sizing that on the night of the attack assurances were made to Bar-
tunek's father but not to Bartunek herself.30 0 The court held that
294. Id. at 460, 666 N.W.2d at 440-41.
295. 243 Neb. 253, 260, 498 N.W.2d 555, 560-61 (1993).
296. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 460-61, 666 N.W.2d at 441 (quoting Hamilton, 243 Neb. at
260, 498 N.W.2d at 560-61 (quoting Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1313-14)).
297. Id. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
298. Id. See infra subsection III.B.2.a.
299. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441 ("Plainly, the exception identified
in Brandon for witnesses and informants is inapplicable in the instant case, and
Bartunek does not argue that it is."). See infra subsection III.B.2.b.
300. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441 ("The record does show that on the
evening before the assault, Snowardt assured Bartunek's father that there was
no need for him to go to Bartunek's home because Snowardt would notify the
McCook Police Department that Piper had missed his curfew."). Bartunek's fa-
ther testified that he would have gone to be with her had this assurance not been
made to him. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Dwight Bartunek, Direct Exami-
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"even if Bartunek's father relied on Snowardt's assurance, this falls
short of showing that Bartunek herself, as the plaintiff, relied on
Snowardt's assurances."30 1 The court also stated that, "in that in-
stance [the night of the attack], Snowardt did exactly as he had prom-
ised . . ."302 The court held that "there was no evidence that
Bartunek acted or refrained from acting in such a way as to exhibit
particular reliance on the actions of Snowardt."3 03 The court cited no
authority to support its narrow night-of-the-attack approach.3 04
The court's approach ultimately defines a threshold for proving
duty that would allow recovery only if Bartunek would have been neg-
ligent to herself in the process of "acting or refraining from acting" in
order to "exhibit particular reliance" sufficient to meet the Nebraska
Supreme Court's standard. If Bartunek had done less to help herself
than she did when she reported violations to Snowardt, secured her
home, tried to avoid Piper, enlisted her family's help, called the police
about phone harassment, and called 911 when Piper was breaking in
to her house just before the attack, her claim would likely be barred or
significantly undermined, because the State would have available de-
fenses for contributory negligence and assumption of risk.305 Under
the Bartunek holding, the State is able to avoid accountability in the
first instance by showing that a plaintiff did not rely enough if she
acted in significant ways to help herself despite actions or assurances
by the State. 3 06 Conversely, the State can also avoid accountability by
showing that a plaintiff relied too much, did too little to help herself,
and was thus contributorily negligent. 307 This outcome is the result of
the court's focus on the night of the attack. Under the court's holding,
nation 416, -:- ("Q: Did you ask [Snowardt] if you should do something? A: I
asked him if I was-should I come in and-and, you know, being there with him
and protect her, and he said no, he'd have a police officer put by the house that
would take care of her. Q: Now, if-if he had told you that-that he couldn't do
that or wouldn't do that, what would you have done? A: I would have went into
town.").
301. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 12-14, Bartunek (No.
S-02-0710).
306. See id. at 13.
307. See id. The State made both of these arguments to the court. See, e.g., Brief of
Appellant at 44-47, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710) (arguing contributory negligence
on the theory that Bartunek did not do enough to protect herself from Piper, ex-
amples of which offered by the State were her failure to notify police of every
infraction or to seek a protection order); see also supra note 98 & infra note 382.
Bartunek titled the subsection of her Brief in Support of her Motion for Rehear-
ing that argued these points: "Damned if she does, damned if she doesn't." Brief
in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 12, Bartunek (No. S-02-07 10).
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prior actions by a victim may work against, but not in favor of, that
plaintiffs reliance claim.
The court's holding fails to take account of the fact that Bartunek's
father had become party to the communications between Snowardt
and Bartunek precisely because Bartunek was continuously frus-
trated by Snowardt's inadequate responses. 30 8 The fact that Bar-
tunek and her father continued to report Piper's violations of
probation committed against Bartunek throughout the summer indi-
cates that they relied on Snowardt to do something about Piper, even
if Bartunek is the only party with a potential cause of action. 30 9 Fur-
thermore, nothing in the record indicates that Snowardt told Bar-
tunek or her father that they should lodge their complaints
elsewhere. 3 10 In fact, when Bartunek went to the police, frustrated by
Snowardt's unfulfilled assurances that he would "take care of it," she
was told that the police could not do much to help, because Piper was
Snowardt's client.
3 1 1
Focusing on the night of the attack not only allowed the court to
proceed as if Bartunek herself had never relied on Snowardt, but this
approach also minimized the meaning of the contact between Bar-
tunek's father and Snowardt in a larger temporal scheme by parsing
up the facts of the case. The assurance made that night to Bartunek's
father was just one example of a series of assurances and actions over
time inducing Bartunek's reliance on an ongoing basis.3 12 The court's
308. See supra note 71.
309. See Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 11, Bartunek (No. S-
02-0710).
310. Id.
311. See supra note 74.
312. The focus here is on the presence of a series of actions and/or assurances to in-
duce reliance. A related issue is the possible difference between actions and as-
surances as a basis for reliance. The Bartunek court characterized the contact
between the probation officer and Bartunek's father on the night of the attack as
a single assurance instead of as part of an action or undertaking (or series
thereof). 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441. In Hamilton v. City of Omaha, 243
Neb. 253, 261-63, 498 N.W.2d 555, 561-62 (1993), the Nebraska Supreme Court
discussed the differing approaches to reliance, with some jurisdictions requiring
actions and others allowing assurances alone to trigger a duty based on an under-
taking to protect. While the Hamilton court did not hold that assurances alone
are sufficient to trigger a duty, it did not rule that possibility out either. Id. at
263, 498 N.W.2d at 562 ('[Aissuming, without deciding, that an officer's assur-
ance alone is sufficient to give rise to a duty, we find that the plaintiffs [suit] was
properly dismissed. . . ."). Even if the status of assurances alone is unclear under
Hamilton, it is nevertheless clear that actions are enough to trigger a duty under
Hamilton. Id. at 264, 498 N.W.2d at 563. Moreover, the Nebraska Supreme
Court's holding in Bartunek that the assurance to Bartunek's father was insuffi-
cient because it was not made to Bartunek herself implicitly holds that an assur-
ance alone would have been enough, had it been made to Bartunek. See
Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441. Therefore, this analysis proceeds
under the assumption that actions and/or assurances are sufficient to trigger a
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focus on the single night-of-the-attack assurance excluded considera-
tion of other assurances made to Bartunek over the course of the sum-
mer. More importantly, this narrow view of the facts excluded actions
by the State over time that induced reliance.3 13 Bartunek thought
Snowardt would actually do something to control Piper-this was a
result of her reliance on a pattern of actions and assurances, not just
the single assurance to her father on the night of the attack.3 14 Bar-
tunek's reliance followed Snowardt's actions of contacting Piper, tell-
ing him to stop his behavior, and imposing restrictions on his
movement. Bartunek's reliance was not based on assurances alone;
nor was it based solely on state communications to her father.
In considering the disconnect between the court's night-of-the-at-
tack approach and the facts in the record, it is important to note that
nothing in Nebraska caselaw requires a court to focus on only the
night of the attack in a case like Bartunek. Although law enforcement
cases often only involve a single incident that could trigger reasonable
detrimental reliance, they can also involve several isolated events,
which are viewed separately. 3 15 However, these scenarios are not the
only possibilities. The chain of actions and assurances over time
serves to distinguish Bartunek from the plaintiffs in every case upon
which the Nebraska Supreme Court relied. This chain provided an
opportunity to define another category of cases fitting the facts of Bar-
tunek. Such a distinction makes sense and would better acknowledge
the reality of violence committed by probationers where the State may
have ongoing contact with victims.
The Bartunek court relied on Morgan, Hamilton, and Sweeney v.
City of Gering.3 16 Morgan involved two separate incidents of requests
for aid made by the wife of a police officer to the police department,
followed by assurances. 3 17 The Morgan court held that the police ade-
quately complied with both requests, and that they thereby dis-
charged any obligations they may have had in each instance.31s
Hamilton involved a single assurance by a police officer for protection
reliance duty under Nebraska law, even though actions probably present a
stronger case for reliance than assurances alone, and the focus will remain on
whether the series was sufficient. See also supra note 106.
313. Actions may present a stronger case for reliance than assurances alone. See
supra note 312.
314. See supra note 73.
315. See, e.g., Hamilton, 243 Neb. at 255, 498 N.W.2d at 558 (finding that police officer
made one assurance to victim of subsequent domestic assault that occurred the
same night as the assurance); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306,
1310 (D.C. 1983) (finding two separate but non-actionable assurances when wife
of police officer made two separate requests for help from the police department).
316. Sweeney v. City of Gering, 8 Neb. Ct. App. 675, 601 N.W.2d 238 (1999). See Bar-
tunek, 266 Neb. at 460-62, 666 N.W.2d at 440-41.
317. 468 A.2d at 1310.
318. Id.
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on the night of a domestic assault.319 In Hamilton, a woman who had
been assaulted and then threatened by her ex-husband requested as-
sistance from the police. 32 0 A police officer responded and told the
woman that he would be in the area to protect her. 32 1 Nevertheless,
the ex-husband succeeded in attacking the plaintiff again, dragging
her down the stairs, and beating her with a tire iron. 32 2 The Hamil-
ton court held that the assurance by the police officer was not enough
to induce reliance, and that some specific action by the officer was
needed to establish a special relationship and thereby a duty. 3 2 3 Even
farther removed from the factual scenario in Bartunek than the iso-
lated assurance in Hamilton or the two separate actions taken in Mor-
gan, Sweeney did not involve any contact at all between a government
official and the plaintiff alleging detrimental reliance, but rather was
about a motorist's unilateral expectation of the city's enforcement of
ordinances prohibiting street obstructions.324
In contrast to this caselaw relied upon by the court, Bartunek in-
volved a pattern of similar actions and assurances over a period of
time in response to similar incidents, which Bartunek reported with
frequent regularity. Each time a report was made, more reliance was
induced because of the authority that the probation officer had over
Piper. This differs from a situation where a citizen requests help from
the police in regard to another citizen who has no special relationship
to the police, as in Hamilton.32 5 This situation also differs from that
where the authority figure has no information on the probability of
attack other than the information from the victim, as in Morgan.3 26 It
clearly differs from a unilateral expectation of government action, as
in Sweeney.327 Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court should have con-
sidered the factual differences in Bartunek and not relied on cases dis-
tinguishable on such central grounds.
Once actions or assurances are shown, another element must still
be proven to make a case for duty. A reliance-based duty requires not
only actions or assurances, but also an affirmative undertaking to pro-
tect implicit within the government's actions and assurances. 3 28
While Snowardt failed to adequately address Piper's violations and es-
319. 243 Neb. at 255, 498 N.W.2d at 558.
320. Id. at 254-55, 498 N.W.2d at 557-58.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 264, 498 N.W.2d at 562-63. However, the three-justice dissent in Hamilton
argued that an assurance, together with the visit to the plaintiff, constituted an
"action." Id. at 265, 498 N.W.2d at 563 (Lanphier, J., dissenting).
324. Sweeney, 8 Neb. Ct. App. at 677, 601 N.W.2d at 241-42.
325. 243 Neb. 253, 498 N.W.2d 555.
326. 468 A.2d 1306.
327. 8 Neb. Ct. App. 675, 601 N.W.2d 238.
328. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 460, 666 N.W.2d 435, 441 (2003); see also supra
note 106.
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calating threat to Bartunek, he nevertheless did "affirmatively act to
protect"3 29 Bartunek and to address some of Piper's violations.
Snowardt assured the Bartuneks that he would take action and never
told them that they should seek protection elsewhere.
33 0 Snowardt
did not take the violations to be serious enough to report them to the
court, but he did contact Piper about the reports from the Bartuneks
and did lead DaNell Bartunek to depend on his further action.
3 3 1 On
only one occasion did Snowardt do more than simply tell Piper to "stop
it," and that was when he imposed a restriction on Piper's proximity to
Bartunek's residence and her child's daycare center.
3 32
Even though Snowardt imposed a specific restriction on Piper's
movement, it is important to note that he imposed this order with
knowledge that Piper had been continuously violating the terms of his
probation and refusing to follow orders, particularly ones that in-
volved staying away from Bartunek.3 33 Piper did not stop his harass-
ment of Bartunek. Thus, Snowardt's affirmative actions to protect
Bartunek were ultimately inadequate to protect her even though they
were enough to induce reliance. 3 34 While Snowardt did act in re-
sponse to requests to end Piper's harassment, Snowardt did not act
with reasonable care once he undertook actions that induced reliance
by Bartunek.33 5 Regardless of a lack of explicit assurances to Bar-
329. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 460-61, 666 N.W.2d at 441 (quoting Hamilton, 243 Neb. at
260, 498 N.W.2d at 561 (quoting Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1313-14)).
330. See excerpts from Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt supra note 73.
331. See supra note 73.
332. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("7/25/97 ... Told
[Piper] he was to develop a 3-block cushion from now on regarding [Bartunek]'s
house and Kidd[i]e Korral. He was not to enter that cushion [without] informing
me first."). However, on the same day he imposed this restriction, Snowardt
granted Piper free time, off the electronic monitor. Bill of Exceptions, E24
(Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("7/25/97... fr[eel time tomorrow will be
shopping with sister/mom.").
333. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 456, 666 N.W.2d at 438; Record at 9, Bartunek (No. CI-99-
87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.) (Findings of Fact: "Mr. Piper began violat-
ing the terms of this probation almost immediately."); id. at 10 (Findings of Fact:
"Despite many requests by the Plaintiff and her father over the course of two (2)
months to have Mr. Piper leave the Plaintiff alone Mr. Snowardt took no action to
revoke Mr. Piper's probation. His only action was to tell Mr. Piper to stop doing
it."); see also Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (not-
ing at least five recorded incidents of the state ordering Piper to stop harassing,
contacting, or threatening Bartunek). The very fact that Piper was told the same
thing so many times illustrates his refusal to follow these orders and the peculi-
arity of Snowardt expecting him to do any different with more specific orders; see
also Brief of Appellee at 15-17, Bartunek (No. S-02-0710).
334. Quite apart from being effective, Snowardt's orders for Piper to stop often further
enraged Piper, inducing retaliation toward Bartunek for reporting Piper's behav-
ior to Snowardt. See supra notes 47 & 73.
335. Failure to use reasonable care is exemplified by the pattern that, following inci-
dents of harassment reported to the state, the probation officer (and his replace-
ment during his vacation) consistently failed to follow up with Bartunek or do
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tunek by the State on the night of the attack, Snowardt's ongoing ac-
tions-including assurances to Bartunek and her father through the
summer, combined with his role as the authority figure with responsi-
bility for controlling Piper and actual orders restricting Piper-consti-
tuted an undertaking to protect and induced Bartunek's reliance.
Given Snowardt's repeated response to Bartunek's complaints, it was
reasonable for her to rely on Snowardt to use the control he had over
Piper to end the harassment and threats, because she knew that he
had the power to revoke probation and to otherwise control Piper be-
yond what he actually accomplished. Moreover, unlike in Morgan,
where the officer discharged his duty, Snowardt did not discharge his
duty by fulfilling his promises or complying with requests to control
Piper.
One final aspect of the court's detrimental reliance analysis should
be examined. Once established, an affirmative undertaking to protect
must be specific in two respects. Citing Hamilton and Sweeney, the
Bartunek court stated that "[1liability may be established . . . if the
probation officer ... [has] specifically undertaken to protect a particu-
lar individual and the individual has specifically relied upon the un-
dertaking."336 The court reasoned that under this rule, Bartunek had
no special relationship with the State, because she did not prove a
specific undertaking to protect or specific reliance on that undertak-
ing.3 3 7  However, the facts of Bartunek support the opposite
conclusion.
On the issue of a specific undertaking aimed at a specific individ-
ual, rather than the general public, the facts reveal a pattern estab-
lishing a special relationship with Bartunek over time. As noted
supra, the development of this special relationship over time is the
distinguishing factor between Bartunek and the cases on which the
Nebraska Supreme Court relied, and is instructive in considering the
specificity of the undertaking to protect and the reliance. It cannot
reasonably be argued that Snowardt's actions to tell Piper to stay
away from Bartunek or his assurances that he would take care of the
problem were directed at anyone but Bartunek, even when communi-
cated via her father. It is reasonable to infer that communications to
Bartunek's father about ending Piper's harassment were meant to be
relayed to Bartunek herself and were meant for her benefit. Certainly
these actions to protect Bartunek were not directed to the public in
general, because Bartunek was the only identifiable target of Piper's
future violence. While Piper had many violations mounting, all of the
any investigation. See Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred
Snowardt) (6/19/97, 7/21/97, 7/25/97, & 8/12/97); Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chrono-
logical Notes of Don Douglas) (7/11/97); see also supra notes 64 & 66.
336. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
337. Id.
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incidents of threats and harassment were directed at Bartunek and
Bartunek alone. The specificity of the undertaking is thus
established.
Further, Bartunek's reliance was specific to Snowardt's undertak-
ing when that undertaking is viewed as the set of actions and assur-
ances that occurred over the course of the summer, rather than just
those on the night of the attack. On the night of the attack, any ac-
tions taken to protect Bartunek came too late, even if on that evening
Snowardt did do what he said he would do, by sending the police to
check Bartunek's house. Sending the police to check on her was more
like a reaction by Snowardt to his own failure to control Piper than it
was an affirmative effort to do so as a fulfillment of his prior under-
taking to protect. Snowardt's actions the night of the attack can
hardly be seen as discharging his duty to Bartunek. Moreover, Bar-
tunek's state of vulnerability on the night of the attack is itself evi-
dence of her previous reliance on the State.
Bartunek's identifiable character and status as the specific target
of undertakings to protect also critically set the case apart from cases
upon which the Nebraska Supreme Court relied in Bartunek. In
Sweeney, no duty was found when the plaintiff relied on a general ex-
pectation that the municipality would keep streets free from obstruc-
tions because this was something the municipality should do.338
Reliance in Sweeney was not based on any specific undertaking to ben-
efit the plaintiff in particular. 33 9 Likewise, the Hamilton court found
that the plaintiff there failed to show that there was more than a gen-
eral request for police protection that would be owed to any citizen.
3 40
In contrast, Bartunek's reliance was not based on an assumption that
probation officers would do their jobs correctly in order to protect
members of the general public. Rather, Bartunek relied on actions
taken and assurances made by a probation officer who knew her situa-
tion, and who was-however inadequately-addressing with his pro-
bationer issues that intimately involved her as an individual.
The Nebraska Supreme Court closed its reliance analysis by em-
phasizing that Bartunek did not offer any evidence that she acted or
refrained from acting in reliance on Snowardt.3 4 1 Requiring a more
drastic showing of reliance than Bartunek exhibited amounts to Bar-
tunek being required to act negligently to herself and potentially bar
her own claim. Although the court did not formally reach the issue of
contributory negligence as a State defense, it effectively did so in its
holding on detrimental reliance. Applying the facts to a theory of duty
in the way the Bartunek court did amounts to saying that there never
338. 8 Neb. Ct. App. 675, 682-83, 601 N.W.2d 238, 245 (1999).
339. Id.
340. 243 Neb. 253, 262, 498 N.W.2d 555, 562 (1993).
341. Bartunek, 266 Neb. at 461, 666 N.W.2d at 441.
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is any duty. A legal analysis interpreting Nebraska's reliance-based
duty to include a series of actions, assurances, and reliance over time
would more adequately address ongoing violence within probation set-
tings, where victims known to the State are highly likely to rely on a
probation officer's power to control a violent probationer following re-
peated incidents of probation violations.
b. "Aid-to-the-State" Under Section 315(b) and Consequent
Increased Danger Should Be Recognized in
Probation Settings
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Brandon v. County of Richard-
son3 42 established a duty to a victim based on the victim's aid to the
State as a witness and the resulting special relationship between the
victim and the State. In Brandon, a transgendered woman who iden-
tified as a man was brutally beaten and raped for his transgendered
status.3 43 The rapists threatened to kill Brandon if the rapes were
reported. 344 Brandon nevertheless reported the rapes and was subse-
quently mistreated by the county sheriffs office during the inter-
view. 34 5 Brandon agreed to file complaints and testify against the
rapists.3 46 But, when there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the
suspects three days later, the State failed to make arrests. 34 7 Instead,
the county interviewed one of the suspects, thus alerting both suspects
of Brandon's report, and allowed them to remain free. 348 Three days
later, the suspects murdered Brandon and two others in a house in
Humboldt, Nebraska.349
Brandon's mother prevailed on her wrongful death claim against
the State, based on a duty owed Brandon due to his status as a wit-
ness.35 0 The court explained the duty in these terms: "The fact that
Brandon went to law enforcement and offered to testify and aid in the
prosecution of [the rapists] was proved at trial. There was a special
relationship between the county and Brandon, and therefore the
county had a duty to protect Brandon."3 51 Brandon's mother also al-
leged a duty based on detrimental reliance, because after reporting
being raped by the two men, Brandon refrained from moving back to
342. 261 Neb. 636, 668, 624 N.W.2d 604, 628 (2001) [Brandon III.
343. Id. at 640-41, 624 N.W.2d at 611.
344. Id. at 646, 624 N.W.2d at 614.
345. Id. at 656-63, 624 N.W.2d at 620-25. The county was found liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for its outrageous and dehumanizing treatment of
Brandon during the interview. Id.
346. Id. at 645, 624 N.W.2d at 613.
347. Id. at 648, 624 N.W.2d at 615.
348. Id. at 645, 624 N.W.2d at 614.
349. Id. at 646, 624 N.W.2d at 614.
350. Id. at 668, 624 N.W.2d at 628.
351. Id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Lincoln, and instead remained in Humboldt, believing the rapists
would be arrested. 352 Nevertheless, in both Brandon I and Brandon
II, the court based the duty and special relationship on Brandon's sta-
tus as a witness acting in aid of the State.
35 3
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Brandon I adopted the reasoning
of Morgan v. District of Columbia3 54 and stated that "a special rela-
tionship undoubtedly exists where an individual assists law enforce-
ment officials in the performance of their duties."3 55 In Bartunek, the
Nebraska Supreme Court explicitly held that the principles of duty
resulting from detrimental reliance and from aid-to-the-state "gener-
ally apply to supervising probation officers." 35 6 These two statements
together indicate that under Nebraska law, aid of a supervising proba-
tion officer should be analyzed in the same way as aid of a police of-
ficer or sheriff. Nevertheless, the Bartunek court dismissed a duty
based on the exception set forth in Brandon for "witnesses and infor-
mants," stating that it was "[pilainly . . . inapplicable in the instant
case, and Bartunek does not argue that it is."
35 7
In the context of the probation system, a witness to or victim of
violations of probation who reports them to the probation officer and
who is willing to provide further information or assistance is analo-
gous to a witness to a crime reporting that crime to police and cooper-
ating with authorities or offering to testify against the suspects. In
probation situations, witnesses can provide reports, statements, affi-
davits, and physical evidence to probation officers, and this informa-
tion can then be used to support reports of violations to the court. 358
However, if no effort is made to collect such evidence, lack of effort is a
function of the probation officer's negligent treatment of the situation,
and is not indicative of the status of someone willing and ready to
provide the evidence. Bartunek, her father, and the McCook Police
Department all were known sources of evidence of Piper's violations of
probation, but the State did not treat them as such. This fact should
not be used to exclude a claim based on Bartunek's status as a wit-
ness. She was aiding the state, whether the State wanted the help or
not. By taking what information she gave the State and even acting
on it to a very limited degree, rather than telling her to go elsewhere,
352. Brandon v. County of Richardson, 252 Neb. 839, 841, 566 N.W.2d 776, 779 (1997)
[Brandon I].
353. Brandon 11, 261 Neb. at 668, 624 N.W.2d at 628; Brandon I, 252 Neb. at 844, 566
N.W.2d at 780.
354. 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983).
355. Brandon I, 252 Neb. at 844, 566 N.W.2d at 780.
356. Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454, 461, 666 N.W.2d 435, 441 (2003).
357. Id.
358. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Probation Supervisor Lonnie Folchert, Direct Ex-
amination 23, 34:22; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Chief Probation Officer Ra-
leigh Haas, Direct Examination 198, 203:07.
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the State established a special relationship with Bartunek. The State
is responsible for failing to seek more information from Bartunek as a
witness and failing to properly act on information it did have. Bar-
tunek should not have to bear the cost of the harm that this failure
eventually caused her.
The State never investigated Bartunek's reports of stalking, har-
assment, or child abuse. In these many instances, the State never fol-
lowed up with Bartunek to ask more questions, take statements, or
obtain affidavits. 35 9 This is the kind of information the State would
need to institute revocation proceedings.360 A typical example of how
the State handled alleged violations is the child abuse incident, where
Piper beat Bartunek's two-year-old until he was black and blue.361
Not only did Snowardt fail to follow up on the child abuse incident
with Bartunek, he "[a]sked [Piper] if [it] could wait till tomor[r]ow" 36 2
when Bartunek insisted that Piper move out after she found bruises
on her child-bruises which Piper admitted to causing and for which
he was arrested and cited. 36 3 Snowardt even "reminded [Piper] that
he cannot be abusing children[ and aidvised him that if [Bartunek]
had reported the spanking in a timely fashion, he would be in the pen
by now."3 64 Nevertheless, Snowardt failed to investigate or report
this incident to the sentencing court or even to his supervisors, despite
359. See Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (6/19/97, 7/21/
97, 7/25/97, & 8/12/97); Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Don Doug-
las) (7/11/97). For one of many examples of this approach to Piper's violations,
see Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80,
107:25 (Snowardt not returning Bartunek's phone call to interview her about un-
wanted contacts from Piper she had reported to the probation department) and
108:20 (Snowardt's statement that "there wouldn't be a need" to contact Bar-
tunek about the ongoing situation); see also supra notes 64 & 66.
360. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Probation Supervisor Lonnie Folchert, Direct Ex-
amination 23, 34:22; Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Chief Probation Officer Ra-
leigh Haas, Direct Examination 198, 203:07; see also supra note 290.
361. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
362. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (6/16/97).
363. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
364. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) (6/19/97). The
child abuse was reported to the McCook Police Department in an "untimely man-
ner" only because Bartunek and her children went to Trenton to stay with her
parents upon discovering the bruises. In Trenton, Nebraska, Bartunek contacted
the police, and they told her to report to the McCook Police Department, since
that was the location of the abuse. To do so, the report had to wait until Monday,
after the weekend. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of DaNell Bartunek, Direct Ex-
amination 319, -:- ("Q: Okay. What-and what did you do based on that, based
on what the folks in Trenton told you? A: They told us-they advised us to wait
until-like the following workday, like Monday or whatever the next following
workday was because they had a hard time probably-going to find a detective
around in town here. Q: Okay. And so did you then decide you were going to see
the McCook police? A: Yes. They told-they advised us to go to the McCook police
because that's where it was. That's where I lived.").
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the fact that a conviction is irrelevant to the existence of a violation of
probation.3 65 This pattern extended to situations of harassment as
well. For example, when Piper called Bartunek sixteen times in one
day and she reported it to police, who in turn reported it to probation,
probation again did nothing to follow up with Bartunek or the police,
and nothing was reported to the court.36 6 Nor did anyone follow up
with Piper himself about the incident.
3 67
Because the State did not take Bartunek's victimization seriously,
it did not treat her as a witness or informant-however, that does not
mean she was not one. Her role in reporting the serious violations of
probation to the State was in aid of the State, because the State was
charged with supervising Piper, a dangerous felon. The manner in
which the State treated Bartunek's situation is very much like how
the State treated the victim in Brandon.
The State basically ignored the safety of both Brandon and Bar-
tunek. Although Brandon had agreed to be a witness against the rap-
ists, the State failed to protect Brandon from them when it knew
Brandon's life had been threatened to prevent the rapes from being
reported.368 In Bartunek the State failed to act on reports of viola-
tions or take action to prevent further violence by Piper when it knew
or should have known of the threat Piper posed to Bartunek. Both
victims had gone to the State in fear for their safety and to report
their victimization and provide the State with further information
needed to handle the situations. Both had offered to aid the State on
an issue that warranted a response from law enforcement.
Under Brandon, a formal arrangement or agreement to aid the
State does not appear to be necessary. The Brandon court stated that
"[a] special relationship was created between Brandon and the county
when Brandon went to law enforcement officials and offered to testify
and aid the prosecution of [the rapists]."369 Likewise, Bartunek of-
fered to aid the State in dealing with its probationer's violations in her
efforts to supply information and her willingness to cooperate with
Snowardt. Bartunek should have been treated as a witness/informant.
Finally, the special relationship created by an offer to aid the State
does not require an additional explicit promise by the State to protect
the witness or informant. The Brandon court found an aid-to-the-
365. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 102:23;
see also supra note 59.
366. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Don Douglas) (7/11/97); Bill of
Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 120:19, 120:24,
122:02, 122:11 & 122:13; see also supra notes 64 & 66.
367. Bill of Exceptions, Testimony of Fred Snowardt, Direct Examination 80, 122:15.
368. 261 Neb. 636, 646, 624 N.W.2d 604, 614 (2001) [Brandon III.
369. Brandon 11, 261 Neb. at 647, 624 N.W.2d at 615 (emphasis added); see also Bran-
don v. County of Richardson, 252 Neb. 839, 844, 566 N.W.2d 776, 780 [Brandon
/.
[Vol. 83:225
2004] NEBRASKA PROBATION DEP'T OFF THE HOOK 285
state duty despite there being no promise to protect Brandon made by
the county-in fact there was not even a plan or effort to protect Bran-
don, much less a promise.370 Thus, while assurances of protection
made in Bartunek are important to a reliance-based duty, they are
unnecessary for an aid-to-the-state duty.
Brandon offers a characteristic that is useful to limit an aid-to-the-
state duty-a characteristic which is also present in Bartunek. The
fact that the State failed to protect Brandon is compounded by the fact
that it actually made the situation worse by alerting the rapists of
Brandon's report, yet not making an arrest or providing Brandon with
protective custody in the meantime.3 7 1 Likewise, the behavior of the
probation department in Bartunek made the situation worse for Bar-
tunek. The threats and harassment aimed at Bartunek escalated be-
cause the State would tell Piper to stop without taking any real action
to control him. The State had a duty to control Piper based on Bar-
tunek's status as a witness to and victim of his numerous violations,
and its failure to do so actually endangered Bartunek further.
An example of this escalation in violence is the manner in which
Piper reacted when Bartunek made reports. Bartunek had her father
deliver a note to the probation officer that Piper left on her car.
3 72
When the officer asked Piper about it, Piper in turn retaliated against
Bartunek for turning over this note by showing up twice at her chil-
dren's daycare center to threaten and intimidate her verbally.
3 73
These incidents were reported to the officer, who then again addressed
the issue with Piper, who lied about it.374 The ultimate retaliation
370. Brandon 11, 261 Neb. at 667, 624 N.W.2d at 627 ("The record is absolutely clear
that there was never any plan to provide protection to Brandon."); see also Bran-
don 11, 261 Neb. at 647, 624 N.W.2d at 615 (indicating that Sheriff Laux testified
that he "never offered Brandon special protection from" the rapists); id. at 648,
624 N.W.2d at 615-16 (indicating that Deputy Sheriff Olberding testified that
the sheriffs office "never offered Brandon any protection from" the rapists).
371. Brandon 11, 261 Neb. at 648, 624 N.W.2d at 615-16.
372. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("7/21/97 ...
Upon returning to office, found that [Bartuneki's dad had dropped off note [Piper]
had placed in her car. Copy is in his file.").
373. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("7/25/97 . . .
Dwight Bartunek called to say [Piper] had came to Kidd[i]e Korral and hassled
[Bartunek] about her giving me the note he had left in her car. Said he had been
there again this morning. Said [Piper] had threatened them with statement that
his sister (from Colo[rado]) was going to be there this morning to 'straighten her
out.' Told Dwight I would contact [Piper] this morn[ing].").
374. Bill of Exceptions, E24 (Chronological Notes of Fred Snowardt) ("7/25/97 ...
Travelled [sic] to [Piper's workplace] and spoke with [Piper] about the above. De-
nied confronting [Bartunek] at Kidd[i]e Korral about letter.... Tried to make me
believe that Kidd[i]e K. was in accordance with 'direct route' to work. Denied
having been at [Bartunek]'s this morn[ing]. Tol[d] him had till noon to decide if
he was going to be honest with me."), ("7/25/97 . . . [Piper] came to office and
apologized for lying to me about being at [Bartunek]'s this a.m. Told him next
time I would just file. Told him he was to develop a 3-block cushion from now on
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came the night Piper broke into Bartunek's house and attacked her.
He had the opportunity to do this, because, far from being defused or
controlled, he was further angered by Bartunek's reports relayed by
Snowardt and then was left practically unsupervised. Thus, the State
participated in escalating the threat to Bartunek as it simultaneously
failed to act on the threats at each point during the summer of
1997.375
Thus, even if there is reluctance to extend Nebraska's existing aid-
to-the-state duty to probation settings where a victim reports viola-
tions of probation that are also aggressions against her, a duty should
be found in cases such as Bartunek, where the State's treatment of the
witness actually puts her in more danger.376 This duty is essential,
regarding [Bartunek]'s house and Kidd[i]e Korral. He was not to enter that cush-
ion [without] informing me first.").
375. This chain of events is exactly what experts in the field caution against in train-
ing materials for probation officers who are supervising domestic violence offend-
ers. See generally FERNANDO MEDEROS, DENISE GAMACHE, & ELLEN PENCE,
BATTERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE PROJECT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE AND PROBATION (-), available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/
bwjp/probationv/probationv.pdf. Suggestions include: "Do not tell the offender
anything the victim has told you unless you're completely sure that it will not
endanger her further. Even if she gives you permission to share what she has
told you, make your own assessment about safety and the risk of retaliation." Id.
at 4. The guide also provides guidance for assessment of the history of violence
and risk of retaliation and of continued harassment and abuse: "How safe will the
victim and the children be? Is it reasonable to expect the offender to restrain
himself? Has he respected previous restraining/protective orders? Has he
made-and broken-many promises?" Id. at 4-5. Although this information was
written to address situations where the probationer is on probation for a domestic
violence offense, it is relevant to any probation officer supervising a probationer
who is engaging in domestic violence.
376. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). Section 321 provides:
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should real-
ize that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to
another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
risk from taking effect.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time
of the act the actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a
risk.
Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court has imposed this duty even when the act en-
dangering another was innocent as opposed to negligent. Simonsen v. Thorin,
120 Neb. 684, 234 N.W. 628 (1931). In addition to state tort claims for failure to
protect and endangerment by the state, Due Process claims may be available in
similar circumstances. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-202 (1989) (holding that state liability under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is possible only when a state actor
restrains an individual, rendering him or her unable to ensure his or her own
safety and the state also fails to provide such safety, or when a state actor acts in
such a way as to create or enhance a danger or render the victim more vulnera-
ble). The DeShaney court held that, absent government creation or escalation of
a danger, there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and a state actor has no Constitutional duty to act to protect when it
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because the perpetrator is told of the reports, is inadequately con-
trolled, escalates his behavior against the witness/victim, and the
State knows about it, because the witness/victim again reports the re-
taliation. Such endangerment could be used to limit potentially ex-
pansive liability that application of Nebraska's aid-to-the-state duty to
probation cases could create, by limiting liability to victims of viola-
tions that the State negligently handles.
Other jurisdictions have found a duty toward the victims of harm
whose endangerment was increased by the State's negligent supervi-
sion. For instance, in Bonnie v. Commonwealth,3 77 a sexual assault
victim brought a claim under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act al-
leging negligence by the assailant's parole officer. The court held that
a statutory bar to the plaintiffs negligent supervision claim precluded
her going to trial on that issue. 3 78 However, the court did allow the
plaintiff to go forward with her case on a theory of liability based on
the parole officer's active contribution to her harm because the parole
officer had recommended that the parolee continue his employment at
a trailer park where he had keys to all the residents' mobile homes.
3 79
The parolee, who had been convicted of multiple rapes prior to being
on parole, later used the keys to enter the plaintiffs residence and
attack her.3
80
This active endangerment theory of liability applies to the Bar-
tunek case. Snowardt endangered Bartunek by telling Piper about
Bartunek's reports regarding Piper's probation violations, yet did
nothing to prevent the retaliation against Bartunek that followed.
Bartunek was endangered in part because Piper was a violent felon on
inadequately supervised probation and in part because she was a wit-
ness to and victim of his violations who acted to her detriment to re-
port these violations to the only authority with control over Piper.
That authority chose to do nothing, and the escalation continued until
she was attacked and made the victim of attempted rape at
knifepoint.
Finally, as noted in subsection III.B.l.a supra, a critical difference
between Brandon and Bartunek is that in Bartunek the State actually
had control over Piper, whereas in Brandon, the State had no existing
relationship with the dangerous third parties. This factor provides
further support for an aid-to-the-state duty in probation settings. A
legal analysis acknowledging an aid-to-the-state and/or an enhanced
played no part in creating potential danger. Id. at 202. However, lack of a Con-
stitutional violation does not eliminate possible tort claims against a state, in-
cluding those based on special relationships. Id.
377. 643 N.E.2d 424, 425 (Mass. 1994).
378. Id. at 426.
379. Id. at 426-27.
380. Id. at 425.
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endangerment duty in probation settings would take into considera-
tion the acute danger faced by victims of violence inflicted by the
State's dangerous probationers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The impact of finding "no duty" in Bartunek is severe. There ap-
pears to be no fact pattern that could trigger a duty by Nebraska pro-
bation officers to control their violent ISP probationers. Also troubling
is the court's failure to address what a victim of a negligently super-
vised probationer should do now, in light of the lack of legal remedies
announced in Bartunek. The holding in Bartunek fails to adequately
address the danger of intimate partner violence in probation settings
and sets forth a policy that the State does not have to control its pro-
bationers even when they are terrorizing victims known to the State
who have gone to the State seeking help. Bartunek represents a fail-
ure to incorporate the reality of violence against women into legal
analysis. That reality provides policy justification for finding a duty
and informs foreseeability determinations under existing legal theo-
ries that fit the Bartunek case.
Under section 315(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has barred claims by all plaintiffs hurt by neg-
ligent probation supervision, no matter how known, foreseeable, or
identifiable they are. The court failed to consider DaNell Bartunek's
status as a current and known potential victim of the State's proba-
tioner, even though this fact provides an easy way to define even a
very conservative duty to her. In addition to disregarding Bartunek's
known identity and interactions with the State, the court has said
that 24-hour visual supervision is required for a State actor to "take
charge" of a violent person. However, it is difficult to define any sce-
narios where this definition would be satisfied.
In the context of section 315(b), the Nebraska Supreme Court has
set a standard of detrimental reliance that could amount to contribu-
tory negligence, and has overlooked any aid-to-the-state status of a
witness or victim of a violation of probation. 38 1 Just as Bartunek's
interactions with the State could have been used to inform and narrow
a duty based on a special relationship between Piper and the State
381. In regard to the reliance duty as a standard that becomes contributory negli-
gence, see Brief in Support of Apellee's Motion for Rehearing at 12-13, Bartunek
(No. S-02-0710) ("When, then, does the law hold a negligent law enforcement of-
ficer responsible when he fails to do what a reasonable officer would do to prevent
a foreseeable criminal attack?... Simply put, this Court's decision in this case
allows for law enforcement officers to evade accountability when they negligently
fail to take reasonable steps to prevent a foreseeable criminal attack in every
conceivable factual scenario[ ]-no matter what the plaintiff does or refrains
from doing.").
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under section 315(a), the ISP relationship could be used to inform and
narrow a duty based on a special relationship between Bartunek and
the State. Bartunek detrimentally relied on the State's undertakings
to do something about its probationer, who was not some random citi-
zen harassing her without any relationship with the State at that
time. Similarly, Bartunek repeatedly informed and attempted to aid
the State in supervising this violent probationer, whom the State
could control. That relationship set Bartunek apart from those who
report crimes or participate in investigations or trials.
The facts of Bartunek support a duty based either on the special
relationship between the State and Piper or the special relationship
between Bartunek and the State, or both. Moreover, when considered
together, elements from each special relationship inform the need for
a duty based on the other, and only strengthen the arguments for each
independent special relationship and duty. Thus, while both special
relationship duties are strong standing alone, Bartunek's case
presented the perfect fact pattern for either special relationship to be
limited by elements of the other in constructing more conservative du-
ties that courts may prefer. Courts that would not find a sufficient
special relationship between a probationer and the State might do so
with the added element of the identifiable victim in contact with the
State about the probationer's violations against her. Similarly, courts
that would not find a sufficient aid-to-the-state or reliance-based spe-
cial relationship between a victim and the State may be persuaded by
situations where the feared person is a probationer under the State's
control, committing violations against the witness or person who is
relying on the State. Not only were these powerful interactive charac-
teristics of the Bartunek case overlooked, the court also overlooked
ways to limit duty based on requiring that there be a certain level or
pattern of probation violations before imposing a duty. Nor did the
court address the possibility of a duty in cases where the State actu-
ally increases the likelihood of harm to an individual. As a result, the
standards of duty set forth in Bartunek are probably impossible for
any plaintiff to meet.
Finally, the policy set forth in Bartunek condoning negligent super-
vision of violent probationers should be contrasted with the intent of
the Legislature in passing the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act
3 s 2
without exceptions for negligent supervision and negligent failure to
protect. The Act provides for citizens to make any claim for injury
382. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209-8,235 (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002). The in-
tent of the Legislature in enacting the State Tort Claims Act is set out as follows:
§ 81-8,209. State Tort Claims Act; purpose.
The State of Nebraska shall not be liable for the torts of its officers,
agents, or employees, and no suit shall be maintained against the state,
any state agency, or any employee of the state on any tort claim except to
the extent, and only to the extent, provided by the State Tort Claims Act.
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"caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the state ... acting within the scope of his or her office or employ-
ment," where the State, "if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death."383 This umbrella
would include claims for negligent supervision of probationers unless
that activity is specifically excepted in subsequent sections. The list of
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,209 (Reissue 1996). Under the State Tort Claims Act,
State immunity is waived in situations that fit the statutory scope of allowable
claims. Citizens may sue the State by making
any claim against the State of Nebraska for money only on account of
damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the state, while acting within the scope of his or her office or employ-
ment, under circumstances in which the state, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,210(4) (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002). This section
curtails immunity generally. Specific exceptions are enumerated subsequently.
The Legislature exempted specific State behaviors in section 81-8,219. For in-
stance, subsection (1) provides:
§ 81-8,219. State Tort Claims Act; claims exempt.
The State Tort Claims Act shall not apply to:
(1) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the state,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, rule, or regulation,
whether or not such statute, rule, or regulation is valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a state agency or an employee of
the state, whether or not the discretion is abused.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219 (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002) (emphasis added).
In Bartunek, the Nebraska Supreme Court did not reach the State's immunity
claims under this section, but the district court did discuss the State's claims,
finding that section 81-8,219(1) did not apply to the situation in Bartunek. Re-
cord at 14-15, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Journal Entry & J.) (Sov-
ereign Immunity Based on Discretionary Function). The district court found that
since there was breach, the "due care" clause of the section did not apply. Id. at
14. It went on to find that supervision of a probationer is not included within the
meaning of "discretionary function or duty" included in the second clause of the
section. Id. at 15. The district court relied on the Nebraska Supreme Court's
interpretation of the State Tort Claims Act's discretionary exemption in Norman
v. Ogallala Public School District, 259 Neb. 184, 609 N.W.2d 338 (2000). In Nor-
man, the Nebraska Supreme Court relied on Talbot v. Douglas County, 249 Neb.
620, 544 N.W.2d 839 (1996), in holding: "The discretionary function exemption in
tort claims acts extends only to basic policy decisions and not to the exercise of
discretionary acts at an operational level. The political subdivision remains lia-
ble for negligence of its employees at the operational level, where there is no room
for policy judgment." Norman, 259 Neb. at 192, 609 N.W.2d at 346 (citations
omitted). Relying on this authority, the district court in Bartunek found that su-
pervisory decisions made by a probation officer are "not basic policy decisions but
ministerial actions. Such decisions are not planning level decisions involving so-
cial, economic, or political judgment and do not come within the discretionary
function exception." Record at 15, Bartunek (No. CI-99-87) (District Court Jour-
nal Entry & J.); see also supra notes 98 & 307 (discussing the State's defenses in
Bartunek).
383. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,210(4) (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
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exceptions in the Act does not include an exception for negligent su-
pervision or negligent failure to protect-in fact, the State's only
claims of immunity in Bartunek were based on discretion and due
care, immunity claims that the district court rejected.
38 4
Because no statutory immunities apply to the State under the Bar-
tunek facts, the court's holdings directly contradict legislative intent.
The Act allows all claims that could be brought against a private citi-
zen for negligence and does not specifically exclude probation, supervi-
sion, or failure to protect situations. Thus, the statute does not act on
these cases other than to allow such claims under the general waiver
of immunity.38 5 The lack of an exception indicates that Legislature
intended that Nebraskans be able to sue for damages caused by the
State's negligence in cases of negligent probation supervision and neg-
ligent failure to protect victims like Bartunek. 38 6 The Bartunek court
did not claim to reach the State's defenses of immunity, but it implic-
itly validated them.3 87 The decision therefore amounts to judicially-
created state immunity.
In Taggart v. State, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed
legislative intent in holding that parole officers did have a duty to vic-
tims under Washington's statutory system. It emphasized that the
Legislature could "limit or eliminate" the duty by broadening parole
officers' immunity. 38 8 This statement was reiterated by the court in
Hertog v. City of Seattle over seven years later, which added that
"[the Legislature has n6t enacted such legislation."38 9 Thus, legisla-
tive silence on immunity for parole officers meant that liability could
and should be imposed. Likewise, in Sterling v. Bloom,390 where lia-
bility was allowed for negligent supervision of a probationer, a concur-
rence in the Supreme Court of Idaho decision discussed the policy
384. See NEn. REV. STAT. § 81-8,219 (Reissue 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2002); see also supra
note 382 (discussing the non-applicability of the immunity exception found in sec-
tion 81-8,219(1) and claimed by the State in Bartunek). Immunity for negligent
supervision or negligent failure to protect was not among the State's claims, be-
cause there is no such exception in the Act.
385. See State v. Brouillette, 265 Neb. 214, 225, 665 N.W.2d 876, 887 (2003) ("The
legal principle ofexpressio unius est exclusio alterius recognizes the general prin-
ciple of statutory construction that an expressed object of a statute's operation
excludes the statute's operation on all other objects unmentioned by the stat-
ute."); see also Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 15, Bar-
tunek (No. S-02-0710).
386. Brief in Support of Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 15, Bartunek (No. S-02-
0710) (arguing that the Legislature intended "that citizens should be able to hold
[the State] accountable for damages caused by [the State's] negligent supervision
and negligent failure to protect.").
387. Id. (arguing that the court's holdings "functionally added" exemptions to section
81-8,219).
388. 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992).
389. 979 P.2d 400, 408 (Wash. 1999).
390. 723 P.2d 755, 777 (Idaho 1986).
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ramifications of limiting liability beyond what the Idaho Tort Claims
Act required. It argued against any court implementing a "perceived
policy need to limit the government's potential liability more than the
government itself considered necessary."39 1
While the Bartunek court never discussed the legislative intent be-
hind the Nebraska Tort Claims Act, nor any need it perceived to limit
the State's potential liability "more than the government itself consid-
ered necessary," the court imposed just such a limitation. By finding
the State owed Bartunek no duty, the Nebraska Supreme Court rein-
stated an area of sovereign immunity that the Nebraska Legislature
did not provide for in the State Tort Claims Act's exceptions to the
general waiver of sovereign immunity. This judicial expansion of
state immunity where the Legislature did not leave it intact is a fun-
damental flaw in Bartunek. Women and other victims of violence will
continue to be the parties harmed by this flaw.
Limits on duty such as in Bartunek thwart not only legislative in-
tent and remedies for victims, but also victim safety and a chance at
an adequate response to violence against women on a policy level. Ju-
dicial commentary on denying a reliance-based duty in Nebraska is
instructive not only in considering reliance, but also in considering the
391. 723 P.2d at 777 (Huntley, J., concurring). The preceding context of the quote is
provided:
Ultimately, the unambiguous message of the Idaho Tort Claim Act's lan-
guage and of the relevant case law compelled our decision. In that sense,
this is a judicially conservative decision; it adheres closely to the law as
the legislature wrote it...
In contrast with the majority opinion, the dissent's desired activist
result would cast aside the legislature's clear intent as expressed in the
statutory language .. .in favor of a perceived policy need to limit the
government's potential liability more than the government itself consid-
ered necessary.
Id. (emphasis added). As cited in Sterling, the Idaho Tort Claims Act provides:
6-903. Liability of governmental entities-Defense of employees.-(a)
Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is
subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or oth-
erwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting
within the course and scope of their employment or duties, whether aris-
ing out of a governmental or proprietary function, where the governmen-
tal entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money damages
under the laws of the state of Idaho, provided that the governmental en-
tity is subject to liability only for the pro rata share of the total damages
awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the negligent or
otherwise wrongful acts or omissions of the governmental entity or its
employees.
723 P.2d at 758 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (Michie 1998)) (emphasis in origi-
nal). After Sterling, the Idaho Legislature did adjust the scope of governmental
immunity to provide immunity in all cases except those involving reckless, willful
and wanton conduct. See Harris v. State, 847 P.2d 1156 (Idaho 1992); see also
supra note 243.
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other sources of duty in a case like Bartunek. In Hamilton, a case
upon which the Bartunek court heavily relied in its section 315(b)
analysis, the dissent wondered:
If recovery is denied when an officer explicitly assures a victim of domestic or
other violence that he or she may remain at home and be protected, and fails
to do so, then when can liability be established? To permit defendants to es-
cape liability without even a trial in such circumstances would prevent citizens
from ever recovering due to clear negligence of the police following a promise of
protection which a hapless victim relies on.
3 9 2
While Bartunek is distinguishable from Hamilton in some respects,
both cases present situations where the court has decided not to allow
liability on state actors under the State Tort Claims Act. Notably,
Hamilton is yet another case where the court has refused to find a
special relationship in a case involving domestic violence. In fact,
most of the cases analyzed in this Note that provide duty-not only
under detrimental reliance, but also aid-to-the-state, "taking charge"
of a violent person, and identifiable victim status-present situations
of sexualized violence and violence against women. These cases were
not selected for that similarity to Bartunek. Rather, they are the
types of cases where this duty issue is routinely raised and analyzed.
Violence against women is pervasive. Intimate partner violence
constitutes the majority of this violence. This is the cultural reality of
women's lives in Nebraska, as in the rest of the country. The legal
analysis and ensuing public policy set forth in Bartunek deny this re-
ality. Bartunek involved a very specific manifestation of the general
problem of violence against women. It offered facts conducive to for-
warding a public policy that could address this general problem via a
narrow legal duty on state actors with the ability to prevent it in par-
ticular types of situations. Using a legal analysis that incorporates
the reality of violence against women is the clearest way to get to that
duty. Professor Bender suggests that "[i]f something is factually inco-
herent from women's experiences and understandings, then it must
also be legally incoherent."3 93 Bartunek is unfortunately one more ex-
ample of what Bender describes as a legal system where male-cen-
tered perspectives dominate and where "women's perspectives and
experiences have been left out of doctrinal development and law appli-
cation in the tort area."3 94
Women and other victims of violence need sensible remedies like
the duty advocated for here. This is a remedy that the State is plenty
able to provide by using due care in supervising violent probationers
like Piper or by facing liability when it fails to do so. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has withheld the accountability to Nebraska's women
392. 243 Neb. 253, 266, 498 N.W.2d 555, 564 (1993) (Lanphier, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added).
393. Bender, supra note 160, at 336.
394. Bender, supra note 160, at 336-37.
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and other victims of preventable and foreseeable violence that such a
remedy would provide. Finding a duty in Bartunek would have been a
crucial step in addressing violence against women as the urgent social
problem that it is. A duty to Bartunek would have addressed this vio-
lence in a case where various legal theories independently support
finding a duty, especially when the dynamics of intimate partner vio-
lence are considered important to thorough legal analysis. Without
such a remedy, systems that condone and perpetuate violence against
women will not be held accountable. In turn, actors in these systems
are provided no legal incentive or policy direction to act reasonably
and within the scope of their public purpose to prevent it. Given the
current functioning of these systems, combined now with the policy
message of Bartunek, violence against women will continue-un-
checked by a fundamentally biased institutional and policy
framework.
Gretchen S. Obrist
